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Voluntary public disclosure of soft information—corporate projections and
predictions and other forward-looking statements—is now the norm, following a
brief learning curve after the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act’s safe harbor for forward-looking information in 1995. As a consequence,
allegations of false forward-looking statements are also quite standard in today’s
class action securities fraud pleading. This work addresses an emerging trend,
spearheaded by the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Asher v. Baxter International, to
introduce a subjective scienter or intent-like inquiry into consideration of the
application of the PSLRA’s safe harbor. Numerous district courts have followed
Asher’s lead, employing a variety of semantic maneuvers to circumvent the safe
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harbor’s straightforward, occasionally distasteful application. Bolstered by a 2009
opinion from the Fifth Circuit, this important minority view has created a circuit
court split. This Article provides a definitive analysis of the Asher-inspired
jurisprudential detour, concluding that it is supported neither by the statute and its
legislative history, nor any sound policy argument. With this premise established,
the Article then prescribes intellectually grounded ameliorative measures that can
be taken by courts, which face increasingly imaginative and often appealing
arguments for avoiding the prophylactic nature of the statutory safe harbor.
INTRODUCTION
When can a forward-looking statement be false, and so, perhaps, fraudulent? An
issuer’s predictions and projections regarding future corporate conduct or
performance are, by definition, forward looking. Yet despite the 1995 enactment of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s safe harbor for such forward-looking
statements, plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions today routinely allege that
issuers have made deliberately false projections and predictions. Setting aside what
might be an interesting philosophical paradox about the potential for falsity of
future events as described in the present, this Article explores that question from a
legal standpoint.
Early commentary on the PSLRA’s safe harbor for forward-looking statements
was quick to point out that the statute may have created a “license to defraud.”1
Because it expressly excludes consideration of an issuer’s state of mind when
making forward-looking statements, the statute does appear to create an opening for

1. E.g., William H. Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, and Recklessness Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 121, 132 (1997) (“[I]f cautionary language is
used, there is no liability even if the forward-looking statement is made with actual
knowledge of its falsity. This remarkable provision appears to be the only provision of the
federal securities laws that actually permits making false statements knowingly to
investors.”); Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38 ARIZ. L. REV.
717, 732 (1996) (“[The safe harbor provision] appears to go far, for the first time in the
history of federal securities laws, to immunize certain deliberately false statements.”
(emphasis in original)); Steven J. Spencer, Note, Has Congress Learned Its Lesson? A Plain
Meaning Analysis of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 71 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 99, 122 (1997) (“[A]ny statement accompanied by statutorily sufficient cautionary
language might be a blatant lie, and yet remain protected by the safe harbor.”); see also
Nancy J. Kim, Proposal a ‘License to Lie’? Foes Blast Reform of Securities Law, RECORD
(Bergen Cnty., N.J.), Nov. 12, 1995, at B1; cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 BUS. LAW.
975, 989 (1996) (calling “unseemly” any interpretation of the safe harbor that purports to
immunize a “bald, knowing lie” or deliberately false projection, despite what he
acknowledges is an inevitable reading of the plain text of the statute); Donald C. Langevoort,
Disclosures that “Bespeak Caution,” 49 BUS. LAW. 481, 488 (1994) (noting that what he
calls “strong” uses of the “bespeaks caution” doctrine—the common law doctrine from
which the statutory safe harbor springs—apparently insulates from liability “even deliberate
misrepresentation”). Much of this commentary echoed the polemical rhetoric in Congress
before the passage of the PSLRA. See infra notes 77–79.
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deceitful predictions and projections.2 Deemed in turn “unseemly,”3 “remarkable,”4
and unique “in the history of the federal securities laws,”5 the safe harbor’s lack of
a scienter requirement has been the subject of quite a bit of speculation and
derision.6 Critics feared that if courts applied the plain language of the safe harbor
literally, the new statute would immunize intentional schemes to defraud as long as
they were properly couched as projections. But since the initial commotion over
this state of affairs dissipated, not much has been written about it.7
Instead the safe harbor has simply become an integral component of issuer
disclosure.8 Now, a decade and a half since the enactment of the PSLRA, so-called
safe harbor “warnings” are a standard feature of issuers’ periodic reports and other

2. The statutory safe harbor protects forward-looking statements that are “identified as
[such]” and “accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u5(c)(1)(B)(i), 77z-2(c)(1)(B)(i) (2006). The relevant portion of the statute is quoted in Part I
below.
3. Coffee, supra note 1, at 989.
4. Kuehnle, supra note 1, at 132.
5. Seligman, supra note 1, at 732.
6. See supra note 1.
7. One early article approaches the safe harbor from the standpoint of implying a duty
of good faith. See Jennifer O’Hare, Good Faith and the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: It’s Not
Just a State of Mind, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 619 (1997) (concluding that good faith should not
be a consideration in connection with either the statutory safe harbor or the bespeaks caution
doctrine on which it is based). More recently, a pair of student comments has addressed
some of the matters studied here. See Veronica H. Montagna, Note, The First Prong of the
Safe Harbor Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Can It Still Provide
Shelter from the Storm in the Wake of Asher v. Baxter International Inc.?, 58 RUTGERS L.
REV. 511 (2006) (calling for a new SEC rule); Alfred Wang, Comment, The Problem of
Meaningful Language: Safe Harbor Protection in Securities Class Action Suits After Asher
v. Baxter, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1907 (2006) (concluding that the legislative history of the
PSLRA does not support the Seventh Circuit’s position on false forward-looking
statements); see also Hugh C. Beck, The Substantive Limits of Liability for Inaccurate
Predictions, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 161, 165 (2007) (arguing that a “falsity-driven” analysis of the
safe harbor’s “meaningful cautionary language” requirement, one grounded in the Supreme
Court’s pre-PSLRA Virginia Bankshares decision, is superior to traditional materiality
analysis, which he posits incentivizes issuers to deluge investors with immaterial information
and encourages managers to mask fraudulent statements with significant but incomplete risk
disclosures). This Article disagrees with Mr. Beck’s analysis, which does not squarely
address the case law treated here. Professor Horwich’s work, which was published after this
Article was written, addresses some of the case law discussed here, arriving at a similar
conclusion. See Allan Horwich, Cleaning the Murky Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking
Statements: An Inquiry into Whether Actual Knowledge of Falsity Precludes the Meaningful
Cautionary Statement Defense, 35 J. CORP. L. 519 (2010) (disagreeing with the position
taken by the SEC in its amicus brief for Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 604 F.3d 758, 766 (2d
Cir. 2010), that “a false historical statement that is implied by the cautionary statements is
not protected by the safe harbor”).
8. Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, Litigation Risk and Voluntary Disclosure: The
Use of Meaningful Cautionary Language 3 (2nd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal
Studies Paper) (Aug. 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=998590.
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communications in which they disseminate such soft information as earnings
estimates and earnings per share, growth in demand for their products, cash flow,
and the like.9 These safe harbor legends typically both identify such soft
information as forward looking—as required by the statute—and provide for the
investor’s consideration a list of risk factors that may cause a variation in the
results.10 As an unsurprising consequence, the applicability of the safe harbor is an

9. A study conducted by the New York City Bar Association two years after the
PSLRA’s enactment concluded that cautionary language had become routine in issuers’
periodic reports. Comm. on Sec. Reg., A Study of Current Practices: Forward-Looking
Statements and Cautionary Language After the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, 53 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 723 (1998); see Marc H. Folladori, Protecting ForwardLooking Statements: The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and Other
Safeguards, in PREPARATION OF ANNUAL DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 601, 616–17 (Practising
Law Institute 2005) (discussing the New York City Bar Association study); see also Eric
Talley, Disclosure Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1978–79 (2001) (discussing the “fairly
common practice” of issuing safe harbor warnings, and quoting a typical press release).
Notably, there is and has been somewhat vigorous debate over whether the statute
increased the flow of useful predictive information from issuers. E.g., Stephen J. Choi,
Company Registration: Toward a Status-Based Antifraud Regime, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 567,
574–76 (1997) (foreseeing that frivolous suits will continue to prove costly and that
additional reform will likely be necessary post-PSLRA); Harvey L. Pitt, Karl A.
Groskaufmanis, David B. Hardison & Dixie L. Johnson, Promises Made, Promises Kept:
The Practical Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 845, 856 (1996) (predicting that despite clear legislative directive to bar
discovery pending dismissal motion based on safe harbor, “courts will be reluctant to
dismiss, without some inquiry, claims that companies and their executives lied to their
investors”); Richard A. Rosen, The Statutory Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements
After Two and a Half Years: Has It Changed the Law? Has It Achieved What Congress
Intended?, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 645, 645 (1998) (asserting that in its first two years, the safe
harbor provision had “wholly failed” to foster more forward-looking disclosure); Marc I.
Steinberg, Securities Law After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act—Unfinished
Business, 50 SMU L. REV. 9, 19–20 (1996) (forecasting “greater flow of ‘soft’ information to
the financial markets” as a result of the statute); see also Beck, supra note 7; Marilyn F.
Johnson, Ron Kasznik & Karen K. Nelson, The Impact of Securities Litigation Reform on
the Disclosure of Forward-Looking Information by High Technology Firms, 39 J. ACCT.
RES. 297, 323 (2001); Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 928.
10. See, e.g., Baron v. Smith, 380 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting text of a safe
harbor warning set forth at the end of the issuer’s press release); In re PEC Solutions, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 418 F.3d 379, 384 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting text of a safe harbor warning issued at
the beginning of a conference call); Employers Teamsters Local Nos. 175 and 505 Pension
Trust Fund v. Clorox Co., 353 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2004) (same); cf. Robert A.
Prentice, Vernon J. Richardson & Susan Scholz, Corporate Web Site Disclosure and Rule
10b-5: An Empirical Evaluation, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 531 (1999) (describing use of corporate
web sites to disseminate forward-looking information, which typically has been published
elsewhere first). For examples of safe harbor legends in corporate disclosures, see
MCDONALDS CORP., RISK FACTORS AND CAUTIONARY STATEMENT REGARDING FORWARDLOOKING STATEMENTS, http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/etc/medialib/aboutMcDonalds/
investor_relations.Par.70378.File.dat/2Q%202009%20Risk%20Factors%20and%20Cautiona
ry%20Statement%20Regarding%20Forward.pdf; LIBERTY MUTUAL GRP., CAUTIONARY
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issue in most class action securities fraud suits.11 Complaints allege reckless and
intentional misrepresentations of both existing facts and forecasts; issuers defend
by seeking to dismiss the case, in whole or in part, based on the safe harbor.12
Thus, at this point there is ample fodder for critical assessment of the concept of
deceitful forward-looking statements, and for some prescriptive thoughts
thereupon. The study proceeds as follows. As a backdrop, Part I briefly reviews the
text of the statutory safe harbor and describes the seminal circuit court cases, which
aptly and without reference to contemporaneous scienter apply the statute to
allegedly deceitful forward-looking statements in corporate disclosures. Part II then
introduces and examines a line of noteworthy judicial opinions that deviate from
this standard, injecting a state-of-mind requirement into the safe harbor either
directly or indirectly. Parts III and IV assess this unique and growing decisional
subset in light of the legislative history of the statutory safe harbor on the one hand,
and pertinent policy considerations on the other. This analysis supports the thesis
that the judicial opinions that have incorporated a scienter or scienter-like analysis
into their safe harbor determinations were incorrectly decided.
Part V then offers several remedies for this errant jurisprudence. First, to
overcome their natural instinct to consider scienter, courts must drill deeper into the
plaintiffs’ allegations and parse purported forward-looking statements. Second, to
immunize only those who comply with both the literal and the intended meaning of
the safe harbor, courts must exercise extreme caution when dealing with mixed
statements and mixed lists of risk factors. Finally, Part V advocates use of the
judicial heuristic expressly sanctioned by the PSLRA—an objective, neutral
assessment of the effect on a “reasonable investor” that a projection and its
cautionary language together would have.
I. THE HISTORY AND LURE OF PROTECTION FOR FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS
Forward-looking statements are the subset of predictive information provided by
issuers to the capital markets. Such “soft” information includes earnings estimates
and projected earnings per share, proposed capital expenditures, expected growth in
demand for products, and likely future cash flow.13 Commentators have described
NOTICE REGARDING FORWARD-LOOKING INFORMATION, http://www.libertymutualgroup.com/
omapps/ContentServer?c=cms_document&pagename=LMGInvestorRelations%2Fcms_docu
ment%2FShowDoc&cid=1138357074055.
11. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS 2008: A
YEAR IN REVIEW 21 (2009), http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2008_YIR/
20090106_YIR08_Full_Report.pdf (reporting that in 2008, 70% of class action securities
fraud suits included allegations of false forward-looking statements, compared to 63% in
2007, and 72% in 2006).
12. See Joseph De Simone, Matthew D. Ingber & Evan A. Creutz, Practitioner Note,
Asher to Asher and Dust to Dust: The Demise of the PSLRA Safe Harbor?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. &
BUS. 799, 810 (2005) (describing the assertion of a safe harbor defense as routine and
“reflexive”).
13. The statute identifies a forward-looking statement as any of the following:
(A) a statement containing a projection of revenues, income (including income
loss), earnings (including earnings loss) per share, capital expenditures,
dividends, capital structure, or other financial items;
(B) a statement of the plans and objectives of management for future
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this internally prepared guidance as some of the most useful and important
information flowing out of a publicly traded company.14 Of course, management
makes such disclosures at its own risk: the company’s failure to achieve a predicted
target may increase investors’ predisposition to sue for securities fraud.15 While the
appeal of forward-looking statements to investors has long been recognized, some
commentators have argued that the risk of their speculative nature is outweighed by
the benefit of additional disclosure.16
The following subparts briefly review the history of the PSLRA’s safe harbor
and examine its precise text. These provide the backdrop against which expected
errors in its application can then be assessed.

operations, including plans or objectives relating to the products or services of
the issuer;
(C) a statement of future economic performance, including any such statement
contained in a discussion and analysis of financial condition by the
management or in the results of operations included pursuant to the rules and
regulations of the Commission;
(D) any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any statement
described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C);
(E) any report issued by an outside reviewer retained by an issuer, to the extent
that the report assesses a forward-looking statement made by the issuer; or
(F) a statement containing a projection or estimate of such other items as may
be specified by rule or regulation of the Commission.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(1) (2006); see also Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexorable March
Toward a Continuous Disclosure Requirement for Publicly Traded Corporations: “Are We
There Yet?,” 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 135, 149 (1998) (discussing the statute’s definition of
“forward-looking statement”).
14. For example, as a pair of authors advocating more disclosure of soft information
notes:
Congress, the Commission, and the courts all agree management’s best
expectation for the future also may be a very useful basis for predicting the
future. Indeed, in many instances, management’s expectations for the future
may provide a better source than historic data for predicting the future.
Accordingly, the policy of encouraging companies to volunteer more reliable
forward-looking information, even when disclosure of that information is not
otherwise required, is a sound one.
Carl W. Schneider & Jay A. Dubow, Forward-Looking Information—Navigating in the Safe
Harbor, 51 BUS. LAW. 1071, 1085 (1996).
15. See id. at 1095.
16. See, e.g., Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,723 (Oct.
19, 1994), available at 1994 WL 562021 (detailing the history of the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s position regarding disclosure of forward-looking statements, which
has ranged from prohibiting disclosure of projections because they pose a real danger of
misleading, to actually encouraging their disclosure at different points in history); see also
Union Pac. R.R. v. Chi. & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400, 408–09 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (noting in
the context of a proxy fraud action that “predictions, estimates, and opinions are more
elusive [than statements of historical fact] and may present graver dangers of misleading the
investing public”); Harry Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities
Regulation, 16 BUS. LAW. 300, 307 (1961) (“[A]ttempts by companies to predict future
earnings . . . have almost invariably been held by the Commission to be misleading because
they suggest to the investor a competence and authority which in fact does not exist.”).
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A. Protection for Issuers Making Forward-Looking Statements
Since 1979, well before the 1995 enactment of the PSLRA, a narrow regulatory
safe harbor has been in effect for some forward-looking statements.17 Given that
safe harbor’s limited relevance to predictive statements made in reports filed with
the SEC, however, few courts have applied it.18 Instead, until the passage of the
PSLRA, defendants in securities fraud suits involving allegedly false forwardlooking statements usually sought the shelter of the broader common law “bespeaks
caution” doctrine.19 This judicially developed principle provides a legal vehicle for
courts to dismiss securities fraud claims based on a finding that, as a matter of law,
the defendant issuer’s forward-looking statements include enough cautionary
language or discussion of attendant risks that the defendant cannot be held liable.20
As one court aptly noted, the bespeaks caution doctrine amounts to not much more
than the general judicial proposition that an issuer’s disclosures should be read “in
context.”21 Nonetheless, its protections can be potent for issuer-defendants who
speak frankly to the market about their plans and expectations for the future.
In 1995, the PSLRA codified the bespeaks caution doctrine, at least in part, in a
safe harbor consisting of three substantive components. The pertinent text of the
safe harbor is parsed in the next subpart.
B. The Text of Prong One
As a starting point, let us re-read the relevant statutory language and establish an
operating lexicon that takes into account the complexity of the provision’s
structure. The safe harbor reads as follows:

17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (2010). An identical safe harbor is available for projections
made in offering documents, by way of Rule 175 promulgated under the Securities Act. 17
C.F.R. § 230.175 (2010). These regulations were striking when promulgated, in that they
reversed the SEC’s longstanding prohibition on disclosure of forward-looking information.
See Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Release No.
5362, [1972–73 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 79,211, at 82,667 (Feb. 2,
1973). For a discussion of the SEC’s vacillation on this policy encouraging disclosure of
forward-looking information, see Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the Courts’ Approach to
Disclosure of Earnings Projections, Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft Information: Old
Problems, Changing Views, 46 MD. L. REV. 1114 (1987); John M. Olivieri, Note, Liability
for Forward-Looking Statements: The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Ambiguous
Stance, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 221 (discussing the history of change in SEC’s practice).
18. See, e.g., In re NationsMart Corp. Sec. Litig., 130 F.3d 309 (8th Cir. 1997); Arazie
v. Mullane, 2 F.3d 1456 (7th Cir. 1993); Fugman v. Aprogenex, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1190
(N.D. Ill. 1997).
19. See generally Langevoort, supra note 1, at 488.
20. Id. at 482–83.
21. Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 167 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he ‘bespeaks caution’
doctrine merely reflects the unremarkable proposition that statements must be analyzed in
context.”).
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(c) (1) [In a private securities fraud suit brought under 10b-5, an issuer]
shall not be liable with respect to any forward-looking statement,
whether written or oral, if and to the extent that—
(A) the forward-looking statement is—
(i) identified as a forward-looking statement, and is accompanied
by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important
factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from
those in the forward-looking statement; or
(ii) immaterial; or
(B) the plaintiff fails to prove that the forward-looking statement . . .
was made with actual knowledge by that person that the statement
was false or misleading; . . . . 22
Thus the PSLRA’s so-called safe harbor is a compound statutory provision
consisting of (A) the safe harbor, which is itself two-pronged, and (B) a heightened
scienter standard requiring plaintiffs to show actual intent when fraud is alleged in
connection with forward-looking statements that are not both accompanied by
cautionary language and identified as forward-looking statements, as required by
the safe harbor’s first prong. The instant discussion focuses on the first prong of the
safe harbor, section (A)(i), which is also referred to as Prong One.23 Its other prong,
the “immateriality” prong set out in subsection (A)(ii),24 is generally not relevant to
the analysis at hand. Finally, the heightened scienter standard created by subsection
(B) of the statute, to the extent relevant to this discussion, will be referred to herein
as such (and not as the safe harbor or second prong, as in some other
commentary).25
The statute’s operative language is disjunctive.26 Thus to evade liability for
forward-looking statements that do not come to pass, an issuer-defendant in a
private suit alleging securities fraud may avail itself of either subpart (A) or subpart
(B). In fact, most courts and commentators have concluded that when the defense
seeks shelter under Prong One, the plain meaning of the safe harbor’s text excludes
an inquiry into the subjective falsity or intent of the issuer disseminating a forwardlooking statement. The following subpart discusses this case law.

22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-5(c)(1), 77z-2(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
23. Set out in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i), Prong One has previously been referred to
variously as the “meaningful cautionary statement prong,” Susanna Kim Ripken,
Predictions, Projections, and Precautions: Conveying Cautionary Warnings in Corporate
Forward-Looking Statements, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 929, 935, the “cautionary language
prong,” Talley, supra note 9, at 1977, and the “bespeaks caution prong,” Coffee, supra note
1, at 989. Given the unwieldy nature of these short forms and the focus of this Article, the
more pointed term “Prong One” is used here.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(ii).
25. Id. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B).
26. In setting out the text of the statute, some circuit courts have emphasized its
disjunctive formulation. See Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 604 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir. 2010);
Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 555 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001).
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C. Most Courts Respect the Irrelevance of Scienter
Seminal circuit court opinions reiterate the irrelevance, under the PSLRA’s safe harbor,
of the issuer’s state of mind where meaningful cautionary language accompanies the
issuer’s forward-looking disclosure. For instance, in the Eleventh Circuit’s Harris v. Ivax
Corp.,27 plaintiffs alleged that Ivax’s economic projections were fraudulent, and that the
cautionary statements that accompanied the projections failed to disclose the risk factor that
actually caused Ivax’s actual results to differ from the projections.28 Affirming the district
court’s ruling that Prong One protected Ivax’s forward-looking statements despite the
precise risk that matured not having been disclosed, the Eleventh Circuit panel stated:
All of the statements that the plaintiffs claim to be false or misleading are
forward-looking. They were accompanied, moreover, by “meaningful
cautionary language.” Because we reach this conclusion, we need not in this
case enter the thicket of the PSLRA’s new pleading requirements for
scienter; if a statement is accompanied by “meaningful cautionary
language,” the defendants’ state of mind is irrelevant.29
Relying on the plain language of the PSLRA and on Harris, thereafter the Sixth
Circuit in Miller v. Champion Enterprises, Inc.30 held that “[n]o investigation of
defendant’s state of mind is required” where disclosures were both forward looking and
accompanied by meaningful cautionary language.31 And in a memorandum opinion, a
panel of the Ninth Circuit has articulated the same rule,32 as has the Second Circuit in
dicta.33

27. 182 F.3d 799 (11th Cir. 1999).
28. Id. at 802.
29. Id. at 803 (emphasis added). The court cited H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 44 (1995)
(Conf. Rep.) (“The first prong of the safe harbor requires courts to examine only
the cautionary statement accompanying the forward-looking statement. Courts should not
examine the state of mind of the person making the statement.”).
30. 346 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2003).
31. Id. at 678. Dicta in a number of other circuit court opinions support this
interpretation. See, e.g., PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 681 n.3 (6th Cir.
2004) (“As to forward-looking statements accompanied by meaningful cautionary language,
the PSLRA makes the state of mind irrelevant.”); Theoharous v. Fong, 256 F.3d 1219, 1225
n.6 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he PSLRA shields defendants from liability for forward-looking
statements, regardless of defendant’s state of mind, if [the defendant employs meaningful
cautionary language or the forward-looking statement is otherwise immaterial].”).
To be sure, plenty of district courts have also so held. See, e.g., In re Lab. Corp. of
Am. Holdings Sec. Litig., No. 1:03CV591, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31232 (M.D.N.C. May
18, 2006). Discussion of these district court opinions is outside the scope of this Article.
32. Winick v. Pac. Gateway Exch., Inc., 73 F. App’x 250, 253 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]his
statement is also forward-looking. Because it is accompanied by meaningful cautionary
language, it falls within the PSLRA’s safe harbor and thus is not actionable, regardless of
Defendants’ state of mind.”), withdrawn, 80 F. App’x 1 (9th Cir. 2003); Employers
Teamsters Local Nos. 175 and 505 Pension Trust Fund v. Clorox Co., 353 F.3d 1125, 1132–
33 (9th Cir. 2004) (extending safe harbor protection to forward-looking statements, without
particular discussion of alleged knowledge of falsity).
33. Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 604 F.3d 758, 771 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding the
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Not all courts, however, have been willing or able to disregard scienter in their
analysis of forward-looking statements under the PSLRA. The next Part discusses a
developing group of cases that establish a contrary position.
II. CASE LAW INCORPORATING AN ACTUAL INTENT OR SCIENTER-LIKE INQUIRY
INTO APPLICATION OF THE SAFE HARBOR
Case law interpreting the safe harbor naturally considers a spectrum of issues,
from the general, such as the parameters of the safe harbor’s exclusions,34 to the
more specific: what will qualify as a forward-looking statement,35 when a forwardlooking statement is properly “identified as such,”36 how the required cautionary
language should “accompany” a forward-looking statement,37 and what cautionary

defendant’s purported meaningful cautionary statements not meaningful because they were
no more than boilerplate, and noting Congress’s express direction that courts not inquire into
the defendant’s state of mind when attempting to ascertain the “meaningfulness” of
cautionary statements).
34. E.g., In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 273 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that
a press release issued several months before an IPO that never took place “is not ‘in
connection with’ an IPO” and therefore may be protected by the safe harbor).
35. E.g., Berson v. Applied Signal Tech., Inc., 527 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A]s
[the defendant] uses the term, ‘backlog’ isn’t a ‘projection’ of earnings or a ‘statement’
about ‘future economic performance.’ Applied Signal’s backlog is, instead, a snapshot of
how much work the company has under contract right now, and descriptions of the present
aren’t forward-looking.” (citation omitted)); GSC Partners CDO Fund v. Washington, 368
F.3d 228, 242 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[B]ecause the statement about collectability is a prediction of
the likelihood of collection on change orders and claims, it is a classic forward-looking
statement.”); see also Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 807 (11th Cir. 1999) (ruling that
the entire list of factors underlying a projection or economic forecast is to be treated as a
forward-looking statement); Schultz v. Applica Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1230 (S.D. Fla.
2007) (refusing to deem an issuer-defendant’s entire Form 10-K as a forward-looking
statement entitled to safe harbor protection).
36. E.g., Slayton, 604 F.3d at 765–73 (finding sufficient as identification issuer’s
blanket statement that the use of expectant language anywhere in the disclosure signaled
forward-looking statements); Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 558–62 (6th Cir. 2001)
(holding that defendant’s predictions, which were described as “forward-looking” in some
documents but not in others, could not “find refuge in the safe harbor”); Southland Sec.
Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 372 (5th Cir. 2004) (refusing to apply the
first prong of the safe harbor where the forward-looking statements were not “identified as
[such]”); Griffin v. GK Intelligent Sys., Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 684, 689 (S.D. Tex. 1999)
(same); Tarica v. McDermott Int’l, Inc., No. 99-3831, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14144, at *36
(E.D. La. Sept. 19, 2000) (stating that the statute does not require an “explicit identification”
of the forward-looking statements as such, and that the forward-looking “meaning” of
statements is sufficient to qualify them for safe harbor consideration).
37. See, e.g., Employers Teamsters, 353 F.3d at 1133 (holding that “the PSLRA does
not require that the cautions physically accompany oral statements” where, during a
conference call, the company referred potential investors to its Form 10-K filed the previous
September); Miller v. Champion Enters., Inc., 346 F.3d 660, 677–78 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding
that a letter alleged to include false statements contained meaningful cautionary language
though it referred only to risk disclosures in the company’s Form 10-K); In re Lab. Corp. of
Am. Holdings Sec. Litig., No. 1:03CV591, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31232 (M.D.N.C. May
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statements will be deemed “meaningful.”38 While some of these questions are now
fairly well settled, others remain in flux. Most salient of these is the definition of
“meaningful” as it relates to the cautionary statements that must attend a forwardlooking disclosure for the safe harbor to protect it. Since that determination is
necessarily ad hoc, there are many judicial opinions addressing this question.
Examination of the contours of the safe harbor’s “meaningful cautionary
statements” requirement engenders two types of analysis. First, obviously, is the
fact-specific inquiry into whether specified language effectively neutralizes the
predictions made; and second—where plaintiffs have credibly alleged the issuer
intentionally utilized its forward-looking statements to deceive—is whether and
how those allegations should affect a court’s safe harbor determination at the
motion to dismiss stage. The following subparts discuss both district and appellate
court cases illustrating the latter concern.
A. District Courts Articulating an Actual Intent “Exception”
A growing body of district court cases takes the position that the issuer’s actual
knowledge of falsity of a forward-looking statement will defeat application of
Prong One, even where meaningful cautionary statements have been provided. Two
of these bear detailed consideration. First is Schaffer v. Evolving Systems, Inc.,39 a
case involving allegedly misleading earnings guidance. The court in Schaffer found
the defendants’ disclosure to be both forward looking and adequately supported by
cautionary language.40 Nonetheless, and despite an accurate recitation of the
statutory safe harbor—one that correctly distinguishes between its parts and reflects
an understanding that the heightened pleading standard imposed by subpart (B)
applies to those forward-looking statements that are not accompanied by
meaningful cautionary statements—the court then stated as follows:
Nevertheless, the Court finds that the June 17 press release does not
fall within the PSLRA’s safe harbor provision. Plaintiffs correctly
argue that the safe harbor provision provides no refuge for Defendants
who make statements with “actual knowledge” of their falsity.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, based upon the first-quarter decline in
new business, knew that second-quarter earnings would be much worse
than they reported. . . .
18, 2006) (“[W]hile Defendants’ 2010 Form 10-K may not have been ‘readily available’ to
investors at the time these [oral forward-looking] statements were made [because it had not
yet been filed with the SEC], the older documents cited by Defendants included similar
cautionary language.”).
38. See, e.g., Baron v. Smith, 380 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding cautionary
language in press release sufficient); Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 176 (2d Cir. 2004)
(applying safe harbor and concluding that cautionary statements in offering documents “as a
whole . . . provided a sobering picture of [issuer’s] financial condition and future plans”);
Ehlert v. Singer, 245 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2001) (concluding that cautionary
statements were sufficient where “the warnings actually given were not only of a similar
significance to the risks actually realized, but were also closely related to the specific
warning which Plaintiffs assert should have been given”).
39. 29 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D. Colo. 1998).
40. Id. at 1224.
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The Court finds that these allegations, taken as true, create a
sufficient inference that Defendants acted with “actual knowledge” that
the June 17 press release was false. Thus, the Court will not dismiss
Plaintiffs’ claim on this issue at this stage of litigation.41
The Schaffer court thus imported into safe harbor jurisprudence a rule that
purports to remove forward-looking statements accompanied by meaningful
cautionary language from protection under Prong One, if plaintiffs properly allege
actual knowledge of their falsity. An emerging minority of other courts have
reacted similarly when faced with this type of argument, including a recently
convened panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.42

41. Id.
42. E.g., Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 244 (5th Cir. 2009) (implicitly
adopting rule that where “plaintiff adequately alleges that the defendants actually knew that
their statements were misleading at the time they were made, the safe harbor provision is
inapplicable to the alleged misrepresentations,” but also justifying their holding based on a
subsequent finding that putative meaningful cautionary language was boilerplate); In re
IAC/InterActiveCorp Sec. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 2d 574, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (articulating
“exception” to PSLRA safe harbor protection for forward-looking statements where
plaintiffs properly allege defendants’ actual knowledge of their falsity); In re Thoratec Corp.
Sec. Litig., No. C-04-03168 RMW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30602, at *21 (N.D. Cal. May
10, 2006) (“[H]ere, where the important factors identified in conjunction with the forwardlooking statement are precisely those that the plaintiff contends caused the actual results to
differ materially, it is difficult to see how the cautionary language could be inadequate. Thus,
the inquiry must then move to the second test: whether defendants had actual knowledge of
the falsity of their forward-looking statements.”); In re Airgate PCS, Inc. Sec. Litig., 389 F.
Supp. 2d 1360, 1380 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (“[T]he cautionary statements referenced by
Defendants are not meaningful because—according to Plaintiffs’ complaint—Defendants
knew at the time the statements were made that there were substantial problems . . . .”);
Selbst v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 04 C 2422, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23093, at *59–68 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 21, 2005) (refusing to determine whether cautionary language was meaningful at
the dismissal stage, and concluding that plaintiffs had properly pled “actual knowledge” of
falsity of projections); In re Xerox Corp. Sec. Litig., 165 F. Supp. 2d 208, 219 (D. Conn.
2001) (“[P]laintiffs have pled facts that support a claim that is not precluded by either the
PSLRA’s ‘safe harbor’ provision or the ‘bespeaks caution’ doctrine, namely, that the
defendants knew that their forward-looking statements were false and made them with the
intent to mislead investors.”); see also Goplen v. 51job, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 759, 768
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that earnings projections were not false or misleading since
plaintiffs had not shown that defendants knew or should have known that they were
misleading when made); Yellen v. Hake, 437 F. Supp. 2d 941, 968 (S.D. Iowa 2006)
(“Plaintiff has not offered any facts from which the Court could legitimately infer that
Defendants lacked a reasonable foundation for the projections at the time they were made.
Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to the protections of the Safe Harbor rule of the
PSLRA.” (emphasis in original)).
And, a pair of pre-PSLRA opinions has spawned a line of cases that uses bespeaks
caution analysis to decide safe harbor cases. Applying the bespeaks caution doctrine and
quoting Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 544 (5th Cir. 1981), the court in
Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994), reminded us that “[t]o warn that the
untoward may occur when the event is contingent is prudent; to caution that it is only
possible for the unfavorable events to happen when they have already occurred is deceit.” Id.
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Perhaps more significant than Schaffer and its ilk, however, is the Central
District of California’s analysis and holding in In re SeeBeyond Corp. Securities
Litigation43 denying a motion to dismiss based on Prong One, but employing a
different analysis. The SeeBeyond suit involved, inter alia, alleged
misrepresentations contained in earnings estimates disseminated in a press release
one day after the end of the first quarter of 2002.44 The court expressly considered
the fit of these forecasts within the statutory safe harbor in light of plaintiffs’
allegations that defendants had actual knowledge their estimates were false.45
Holding that the subject earnings forecasts were not protected by Prong One, the
SeeBeyond court reasoned:
If the forward-looking statement is made with actual knowledge that it
is false or misleading, the accompanying cautionary language can only
be meaningful if it either states the belief of the speaker that it is false
or misleading or, at the very least, clearly articulates the reasons why it
is false or misleading. These are undeniably “important factors that
could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forwardlooking statement . . . .”46
A footnote accompanying this part of the court’s opinion sheds light on its
rationale, which is important to the instant discussion:
It may be argued that this reading of [the safe harbor] improperly
imports a state of mind element into [it]. Both Congress and courts
have focused on the fact that, unlike [the heightened scienter standard
for forward-looking statements that are not accompanied by cautionary
at 171. The intuitive appeal of this argument was more colorfully amplified by the venerable
senior district judge of the Southern District of New York, Milton Pollack, in In re
Prudential Securities Inc. Ltd. Partnerships Litigation: “[t]he doctrine of bespeaks caution
provides no protection to someone who warns his hiking companion to walk slowly because
there might be a ditch ahead when he knows with near certainty that the Grand Canyon lies
one foot away.” 930 F. Supp. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
A number of post-PSLRA safe harbor cases, to which the bespeaks caution doctrine
is inapplicable, can be traced to these bespeaks caution doctrine-based authorities. E.g., In re
Evci Colls. Holding Corp. Sec. Litig., 469 F. Supp. 2d 88 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re
Viropharma, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 02-1627, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5623 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 3,
2003); In re Cell Pathways, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 99-752, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8584 (E.D.
Pa. June 20, 2000); Walsingham v. Biocontrol Tech., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 669 (W.D. Pa.
1998); In re Mobilemedia Sec. Litig., 28 F. Supp. 2d 901, 930 (D.N.J. 1998). While not
exactly like the error made by the court in Schaffer, this is a similar conflation of the prePSLRA bespeaks caution doctrine, which very clearly permits and requires consideration of
the defendant’s good faith and reasonableness of the basis upon which the projections are
made, and the PSLRA safe harbor, which does not. See In re World Access, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
119 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1357–58 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (noting in dicta that safe harbor is
inapplicable “when Defendants are aware . . . of the facts that render their statements untrue
when made”).
43. 266 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
44. Id. at 1162–63.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1165 (emphasis added) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (2000)).

608

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 86:595

language], [the safe harbor’s first prong] does not require an
investigation into the speaker’s state of mind.
However, something like a “state of mind” element . . . is already
clearly present in the statute. Whether cautionary language is
meaningful, in that it identifies important factors, can only be
understood with reference to the defendant’s knowledge of relevant
factors. This result follows from the fact that courts and Congress have
made clear that mere boilerplate cautionary language will not do. . . .
Moreover, whether a specific factor is “important” and therefore should
be listed, likely should not be evaluated by an objective standard (i.e.
what the defendant should have known). If an objective standard is
adopted for determining whether a factor is “important,” then it seems
this would heighten the bar of the first prong of the safe harbor
provision, making it more difficult for defendants to take advantage of
its grant of immunity. This result seems contrary to congressional
intent. Instead, it appears as though a determination of whether
“important” factors have been identified should be made with reference
to those factors of which the speaker is aware—things that the speaker
believes may cause actual results to vary. Therefore, it appears as
though the cautionary statement cannot be evaluated without reference
to the defendant’s knowledge.47
Thus, under SeeBeyond, where actual knowledge of falsity of the forwardlooking disclosures is properly alleged,48 Prong One does not provide the issuer
with the important protection from discovery and further litigation that Congress
sought to enact. This is because no cautionary language accompanying forwardlooking disclosures can be meaningful if the issuer is not honest in its assessment
and disclosure of those risk factors that it believes could, as the statute requires,
“cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking
statement.”49 In essence, this view adds a good faith requirement to Prong One.
SeeBeyond is not the only district court opinion to have applied such a rule.50 To
date, no federal court of appeals has articulated the SeeBeyond rule using its exact
terms, though there is a pair of reported decisions from the Seventh Circuit that are
closely related to SeeBeyond and which achieve its same end. There is also some
weak support in dicta from a number of other circuit court opinions for a
SeeBeyond-like result. The next subpart discusses this case law.

47. Id. at 1165 n.8 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
48. The PSLRA requires that scienter be alleged with particular facts, and the
complaint as a whole must give rise to a strong inference of the requisite intent to defraud.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2006).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i).
50. See, e.g., In re Nash Finch Co. Sec. Litig., 502 F. Supp. 2d 861, 873 (D. Minn.
2007) (relying on In re SeeBeyond); cf. Freeland v. Iridium World Comm’ns, Ltd., 545 F.
Supp. 2d 59, 72–74 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that there remained a question of fact as to
whether the risk factors listed by defendant-issuer were meaningful where plaintiff properly
alleged defendants’ knowledge that several of them had already occurred, citing SeeBeyond
and Nash Finch).
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B. The Seventh Circuit’s Asher v. Baxter and Similar Dicta in Other Circuits
Although the prevailing circuit court view, as expressed in Harris and Miller,
recognizes the irrelevance of the issuer’s state of mind under the PSLRA’s safe
harbor, more than one appellate opinion can be read to incorporate an intent
inquiry. Indirect support for this proposition can be found in the Fifth Circuit’s
opinion in Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp.,51 which implies that substantial allegations
of scienter might defeat Prong One even where sufficient cautionary language is
present.52 And dicta in a few other circuit court opinions are certainly susceptible
of, perhaps unwittingly, supporting the outcomes in Schaffer and SeeBeyond.53

51. 332 F.3d 854, 870 (5th Cir. 2003).
52. The court first notes that all of the forward-looking disclosures fall within the
statutory safe harbor:
We note initially that plaintiffs have failed to address the district court’s
holding that all of the forward-looking representations are protected under the
PSLRA’s safe harbor provisions. A review of the record indicates that all of the
challenged documents, except for the Dow Jones News Service article,
contained cautionary language which specifically referred to the PSLRA safe
harbor.
Id. at 869. However, the court then addresses the plaintiffs’ actual-knowledge argument by
comparing the Rosenzweig plaintiffs’ allegations to those set forth in the pre-PSLRA case of
Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994), noting: “Plaintiffs are correct that
predictive statements can be actionable, but, as explained above, their pleadings fall short of
the necessary allegations.” Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 870. It is unclear exactly what is meant
by this, since the Rosenzweig court acknowledges that Rubinstein involved disclosures that
were more in the nature of verifiable statements of fact (not forward looking), and the
Rubinstein plaintiffs successfully pleaded scienter. Id.
53. Indeed, the starting point for the SeeBeyond safe harbor analysis was the Ninth
Circuit’s statement in No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v.
America West Holding Corp.:
The [safe harbor] provisions provide that a person shall not be liable for any
“forward-looking statement” that is “identified” as such, and is accompanied
“by meaningful cautionary statements[”] . . . . However, a person may be held
liable if the “forward-looking statement” is made with “actual knowledge . . .
that the statement was false or misleading.”
320 F.3d 920, 936 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). At least one district court in California
has already misread this statement. See In re LDK Solar Sec. Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1230,
1250 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that actual knowledge defeats Prong One of safe harbor,
citing America West in support). Notably, the SeeBeyond court aptly disagrees with this
statement in the Ninth Circuit’s America West opinion as contrary to the text of the statute,
but then the SeeBeyond court goes on to develop its own equally flawed rule incorporating
intent into the definition of “meaningful cautionary statements.” See In re SeeBeyond Techs.
Corp. Sec. Litig., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (C.D. Cal. 2003); see also supra Part II.A.
Other circuit court judges have used similar loose language in their opinions. For
example, a panel of the Fifth Circuit stated, “[t]o avoid the safe harbor, plaintiffs must plead
facts demonstrating that the statement was made with actual knowledge of its falsity,” but in
the same breath the court properly applied the heightened pleading standard of the safe
harbor’s second prong only to those forward-looking statements that were not identified as
such, and therefore not qualified for protection under the safe harbor’s bespeaks caution
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More on point and precedentially significant, however, is the Seventh Circuit’s
holding in Asher v. Baxter International, Inc.,54 which expressly injects a subjective
analysis into the threshold determination of Prong One’s application.55 The Asher
plaintiffs alleged that healthcare manufacturing giant Baxter International made
intentionally false “rosy . . . predictions” about its 2002 sales, earnings per share,
and operational cash flow, none of which later materialized.56 Despite a finding that
the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to show that Baxter’s disclosures were
“misleading and not made in good faith or with a reasonable basis,”57 the district
court properly dismissed the case because the predictions were both forward
looking and accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements, and thus were
protected by Prong One.58
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court
had prematurely concluded that the cautionary statements accompanying Baxter’s
prong. Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 371 (5th Cir.
2004). Similarly vulnerable to being misquoted is the description of “the safe harbor” by
another panel of the Fifth Circuit—in passing, in the context of a discussion of the PSLRA’s
heightened scienter requirements generally—as protecting forward-looking statements “if
plaintiff cannot demonstrate that they were made with ‘actual knowledge’ that the statements
were false or misleading at the time they were made.” Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d
400, 409 (5th Cir. 2001). And, a panel of the Ninth Circuit has said, “Under the PSLRA’s
‘safe harbor’ provisions, plaintiffs must prove that ‘forward-looking’ statements were made
with ‘actual knowledge’ that they were false or misleading,” without discussing whether the
predictive disclosures at issue were identified as such and/or accompanied by meaningful
cautionary language. In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1021 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting
from Judge Browning’s separate opinion in In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d
970, 993 (9th Cir. 1999)). Similarly vague and subject to possible misinterpretation is the
Sixth Circuit’s Zaluski v. United Am. Healthcare Corp., 527 F.3d 564, 572 (6th Cir. 2008)
(“Where a company does disclose that its statement is forward-looking, liability may still
attach to the extent that the company made the statement in a misleading manner.”).
See also In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999). Advanta
involved application only of the heightened pleading standard of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(1)(B),
presumably because the forward-looking statements were either not identified as such or not
accompanied by cautionary language. But without so stating or distinguishing between the
two prongs of the safe harbor provision other than by precise citation to statutory subsection,
the court stated broadly that “the safe harbor will not apply if the statement was made with
‘actual knowledge’ that the statement was false or misleading.” Id. at 536.
Commentators, too, are guilty of publishing verbiage that could easily be
misconstrued out of context. See, e.g., De Simone et al., supra note 12, at 808 (“[T]he safe
harbor for an oral forward-looking statement applies if the plaintiff ultimately fails to prove
that the statement was made with actual knowledge that it was false or misleading.”).
54. 377 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 920 (2005).
55. See also Makor Issues & Rights v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 599 (7th Cir. 2005)
(invoking Baxter’s requirement that “the principal or important risks” be identified, but
ultimately ruling that the issuer’s cautionary language was insufficiently particularized, i.e.,
boilerplate, and therefore Prong One of the safe harbor was inapplicable to shield it from an
intent inquiry), vacated on other grounds, 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
56. Asher v. Baxter Int’l Inc., No. 02 C 5608, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12905, at *4–10
(N.D. Ill. July 17, 2003), rev’d, 377 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2004).
57. Id. at *27.
58. Id. at *37–43.
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forward-looking statements were sufficient.59 According to the panel, in an opinion
authored by Chief Judge and noted Chicago School jurist Frank H. Easterbrook:
There is no reason to think—at least, no reason that a court can accept
at the pleading stage, before plaintiffs have access to discovery—that
the items mentioned in Baxter’s cautionary language were those
thought at the time to be the (or any of the) “important” sources of
variance. The problem is not that what actually happened went
unmentioned; issuers need not anticipate all sources of deviations from
expectations. Rather, the problem is that there is no reason (on this
record) to conclude that Baxter mentioned those sources of variance
that (at the time of the projection) were the principal or important
risks.60
Because discovery is, according to the Asher decision, required to flesh out the
issuer’s knowledge of risk factors actually facing the company at the time of its
disclosures, the case was remanded.61 Notably, a little over a month later the court
amended its opinion to replace the phrase italicized above “thought at the time to
be” with the presumably more objective phrase “that at the time were.”62
In both its original and amended forms, the Asher opinion introduces a
subjective, factual, discovery-generating inquiry into Prong One. Though the
Seventh Circuit (on second thought) ostensibly eschewed an inquiry into the
issuer’s intent—fraudulent or otherwise—Judge Easterbrook’s subjective issuerfocused rationale for reversing the district court nonetheless echoes the footnoted
analysis in SeeBeyond, quoted above. As a practical matter, it requires that the
issuer have had a reasonable factual basis for its choice of risk factors to disclose.63

59. Asher, 377 F.3d at 734–35.
60. Asher v. Baxter Int’l Inc., No. 03-3189, slip op. at 13 (7th Cir. July 29, 2004)
(emphasis added).
61. See Asher, 377 F.3d at 734–35. On remand, defendants argued that, assuming the
safe harbor did not apply, plaintiffs had not adequately met the heightened pleading
requirement for forward-looking statements set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B). The
court disagreed. Asher v. Baxter Int’l Inc., No. 02 C 5608, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2131, at
*11, *23–24 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2005). Subsequently defendants unsuccessfully sought
judgment on the pleadings based on a purported failure of loss causation, an inquiry that is
unrelated to the thesis of this Article. Asher v. Baxter Int’l Inc., No. 02 CV 5608, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4821 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2006).
62. Asher, 377 F.3d at 734; see Allan Horwich, Is There a Breach in the Breakwater of
the Statutory Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements?, WALL ST. LAW., Sept. 2004
(noting that the amended opinion is likely “more pernicious than the original” in that it
permits plaintiffs to argue “that any risk that in fact materialized necessarily was one that
was ‘objectively faced’ at the time the forward-looking statement was made, thus
eliminating from the liability calculus the factor introduced—albeit erroneously—in the
original opinion of what management ‘thought at the time’ in the absence of perfect
foresight”).
63. The Second Circuit considered this type of argument in a recent case. Slayton v.
Am. Express Co., 604 F.3d 758, 772 (2d Cir. 2010) (“May an issuer be protected by the
meaningful cautionary language prong of the safe harbor even where his cautionary
statement omitted a major risk he knew about at the time he made the statement?”).
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With a single stroke of the pen (actually two, taking into account the amendment)
the Seventh Circuit discarded the PSLRA’s discovery ban,64 just as SeeBeyond
did.65 Asher, therefore, is clearly of a piece with SeeBeyond and its sort, cases that
import a subjective inquiry into the safe harbor’s Prong One and vitiate its intended
power to enable early dismissal of private securities fraud suits.66
***
This remarkable subset of safe harbor case law perhaps may best be explained
by the relevant courts’ instinctual aversion to faithful application of Prong One,67
which could result in the immunization of deceptive statements in apparent
contradiction of the purpose of the federal securities laws. But this repeated,
multiform judicial repugnance to straightforward application of the safe harbor
invites deeper analysis. Is there some ground on which these decisions can be
justified? Is there some other policy basis upon which courts can rationalize their
unfaithfulness to the statute?
The following Parts of this Article look more closely at the Schaffer, SeeBeyond,
and Asher opinions, explaining their error—with reference to preexisting case law,
the text and legislative history of the PSLRA, and policy arguments drawn from the
specific context in which fraudulent forward-looking statements arise. Together
these demonstrate the need to interpret the two prongs of the safe harbor strictly, no
matter if counterintuitively, in the fashion articulated by the majority of circuit
courts that have thoughtfully considered the question.

However, the panel was able to dodge the question because it deemed the cautionary
statements made by the issuer to be “boilerplate,” partly in light of their failure to change
over time despite the nature of the risks facing the issuer changing. Id. at 772–73. Finding
insufficiently particularized allegations of actual knowledge, the defendants thus prevailed
under the heightened pleading standard established by the third prong of the safe harbor, 15
U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B). Id. at 775–78.
64. Mr. Beck argues there are still circumstances in which discovery might be denied,
even under an Asher analysis. See Beck, supra note 7, at 201 n.132 and accompanying text.
65. The opinion thus has drawn some critical ink. See, e.g., Joseph De Simone,
Matthew D. Ingber & Evan A. Creutz, Stormy Waters in PSLRA’s Safe Harbor: Will the
Supreme Court Hear the Appeal from the Seventh Circuit’s Recent ‘Asher’ Decision?, N.Y.
L.J., Feb. 22, 2005, at S4; Sarah S. Gold & Richard L. Spinogatti, Corporate and Securities
Litigation: The Not-So-Safe Harbor, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 13, 2004, at 3; Horwich, supra note 62.
It has also catalyzed discussion and disagreement amongst practitioners. See De Simone et
al., supra note 12, at 799 (“[Asher has] ignited a raging debate in the federal securities bar.”).
66. See also In re Evci Colls. Holding Corp. Sec. Litig., 469 F. Supp. 2d 88 (S.D.N.Y.
2006); Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Sirva, Inc., No. 04 C 7644, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
73375 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2006); Ryan v. Flowserve Corp., 444 F. Supp. 2d 718, 730 n.6
(N.D. Tex. 2006); Selbst v. McDonald’s Corp., 04 C 2422, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23093
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2005); Wu Group v. Synopsys, Inc., No. C 04-3580 MJJ, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 42351 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2005).
67. The possibility that the courts in Schaffer and Asher were guided more by instinct
than by precedent is certainly plausible given that neither of the cases cites to authority in the
pertinent sections of the opinion. SeeBeyond does cite to precedent, but as noted infra, it is
misguided.
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III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PSLRA AND POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR
ERRANT CASE LAW
As discussed above, the plain text of Prong One, disjunctive as it is, does not
support the results or analysis presented in Schaffer, SeeBeyond, or Asher. Nor does
the legislative history of the PSLRA support either Schaffer’s “exception” to Prong
One or SeeBeyond and Asher’s wayward interpretations of its “meaningful
cautionary statements” requirement. The next subpart reviews the legislative
history of the PSLRA, demonstrating that the result in these cases is fairly
unambiguously precluded.68 Then, an analysis of where and why the errant cases
went wrong further elucidates the issues at hand.
A. Legislative History: The Safe Harbor and the PSLRA Generally
Despite its analytical drawbacks,69 congressional intent still is paramount in
interpreting a statute.70 Though there are “many different and potentially

68. This review of the legislative history also disposes of any argument that today’s corporate
and regulatory climate perhaps calls for a reading of the safe harbor that would permit a more
punitive reaction to even a hint of fraud. SeeBeyond and Asher are recent cases; both were decided
in the wake of Enron, WorldCom, and other massive corporate frauds. Perhaps they merely
embody a newly heightened sense of corporate accountability to shareholders, a reading of the
legislative intent that is consistent with a post-Enron view? The answer to this possibility is that
even those who endorse dynamic interpretation of statutes, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987) (advocating that federal statutes
be viewed not only from textual and legislative purpose perspectives, but also from an “evolutive”
perspective, which requires they be interpreted “‘dynamically,’ that is, in light of their present
societal, political, and legal context”), would be unlikely to approve of an interpretation of the word
“meaningful” that upends the clear legislative intent of a recently enacted statute, see id. at 1554–55
(“Dynamic interpretation is most appropriate when the statute is old yet still the source of litigation,
is generally phrased, and faces significantly changed societal problems or legal contexts. [It] is least
appropriate when the statute is recent and addresses the issue in a relatively determinate way.”).
69. Many have criticized legislative intent as meaningless. See, e.g., William T. Mayton, Law
Among the Pleonasms: The Futility and Aconstitutionality of Legislative History in Statutory
Interpretation, 41 EMORY L.J. 113, 116 (1992) (“Reliability, however, is probably not the main
problem. The main problem is that legislative history swamps and muddies some important
functions of legislatures and courts and statutes.”); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use
of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 379 (“[B]enefits accruing from the use of legislative
history are marginal when weighed against the potential for abuse and the enormous effort
involved.”). Most prominent among them, Justice Scalia has warned that reliance on certain aspects
of a statute’s history—the Statement of Managers contained within a Conference Committee
Report notably not among them—is dangerous:
Of course even if all the Court’s invocations of legislative history were not
utterly irrelevant, I would still object to them, since neither the statements of
individual Members of Congress (ordinarily addressed to a virtually empty
floor), nor Executive statements and letters addressed to congressional
committees, nor the nonenactment of other proposed legislation, is a reliable
indication of what a majority of both Houses of Congress intended when they
voted for the statute before us.
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 390 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
70. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842–43 (1984). The Chevron Court noted, in the context of review of an agency’s
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inconsistent sources of legislative history,”71 the Supreme Court’s own practice
legitimates the conference committee report as the most authoritative of all the
documents comprising a statute’s archives.72 The PSLRA’s conference committee
report (“the Report”) is both expansive and explicit, directly addressing the
question of applying Prong One to dismiss an allegedly fraudulent forward-looking
statement.73 In fact, as demonstrated in the paragraphs that follow, it quite
unequivocally rejects the Schaffer, SeeBeyond, and Asher courts’ rules.
Though the Report does not provide detailed guidance as to what the isolated
term meaningful signifies, it does have the following to say about the “meaningful
cautionary statements” the statute requires as a precondition to dismissal:
The cautionary statements must convey substantive information about
factors that realistically could cause results to differ materially from
those projected in the forward-looking statement, such as, for example,
information about the issuer’s business.
As part of the analysis of what constitutes a meaningful cautionary
statement, courts should consider the factors identified in the
statements. “Important” factors means the stated factors identified in
the cautionary statement must be relevant to the projection and must be
of a nature that the factor or factors could actually affect whether the
forward-looking statement is realized.
The Conference Committee expects that the cautionary statements
identify important factors that could cause results to differ materially—
interpretation of a federal statute, that courts are first to ask whether Congress has “directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.” Id.
71. Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality
Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV.
627, 643–44 (2002) (noting that the Supreme Court has relied on most sources of legislative
history and that “legislative reports, particularly conference committee reports, carry the
most weight with the Court”).
72. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320–22 (2007)
(referring to the Statement of Managers from the Joint Conference Committee Report in
interpreting the “strong inference” standard of the PSLRA); see also Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7 (1986) (“We have repeatedly recognized that the authoritative source for
legislative intent lies in the committee reports on the bill.”); Randall W. Quinn, The Supreme
Court’s Use of Legislative History in Interpreting the Federal Securities Laws, 22 SEC. REG.
L.J. 262, 265–66 (1994) (“The materials discussed by the Court [in securities cases], in order
of frequency of occurrence, include committee reports, hearings, prior drafts, post-enactment
materials, and floor statements.”); Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law
Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the
Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13 (1998) (“The interpretive
resources that appear in Supreme Court opinions help to set the boundaries for statutory
interpretation by legitimating particular resources and approaches.”); Nicholas S. Zeppos,
The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1073, 1093 (1992) (reporting that the Supreme Court referred to congressional reports in
thirty-two percent of the cases in his random sample of cases from 1890 to 1990 in which it
sought to determine statutory intent).
73. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.
The conference report includes the “Statement of Managers.” Id. at 31.

2011]

FALSE FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS

615

but not all factors. Failure to include the particular factor that ultimately
causes the forward-looking statement not to come true will not mean
that the statement is not protected by the safe harbor. The Conference
Committee specifies that the cautionary statements identify
“important” factors to provide guidance to issuers and not to provide
an opportunity for plaintiff counsel to conduct discovery on what
factors were known to the issuer at the time the forward-looking
statement was made.
The use of the words “meaningful” and “important factors” are
intended to provide a standard for the types of cautionary statements
upon which a court may, where appropriate, decide a motion to
dismiss, without examining the state of mind of the defendant. The first
prong of the safe harbor requires courts to examine only the cautionary
statement accompanying the forward-looking statement. Courts should
not examine the state of mind of the person making the statement.74
From this, two things are clear. First, the Report makes plain that the
requirement to disclose important risk factors was not intended to open the door to
“discovery on what factors were known to the issuer at the time the forwardlooking statement was made.” The revised opinion in Asher purports to circumvent
this prohibition, but only in something of a cute way. Discovery into what factors
existed at the time of the projection is a half-step removed from discovery into (and
allegations about) management’s knowledge of those factors. Permitting this type
of subjective inquiry will improve hindsight and the power of the hindsight bias
ultimately will prove irresistible to some courts.75 This is precisely the result
Congress sought to foreclose with the safe harbor.
Second, the Report makes quite clear that assessment of the issuer’s intent was
to be excluded from a court’s application of Prong One. A review of earlier drafts
of the PSLRA cements this notion. As first drafted in the Senate, the safe harbor
provision did contain a state of mind requirement.76 But notably this was altered by

74. Id. at 43–44 (emphasis added). Further, in discussing Prong One and the discovery
bar to which the statute entitles a defendant when a motion to dismiss is filed alleging the
application of the safe harbor, the Report emphasizes, again: “The applicability of the safe
harbor provisions under subsections (c)(1)(A)(I) . . . shall be based upon the sufficiency of
the cautionary language under those provisions and does not depend on the state of mind of
the defendant.” Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
75. See Mitu Gulati, Jeffery J. Rachlinski & Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by
Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773, 774 (2004) (“The hindsight bias thus creates a
considerable obstacle to the fundamental task in securities regulation of sorting fraud from
mistake.”).
76. S. 240, the initial Senate version of the bill, provided that (presumably any)
forward-looking statement “knowingly made with the expectation, purpose, and actual intent
of misleading investors” would not be protected by the safe harbor. S. 240, 104th Cong.
§ 105 (1995); see also S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 27 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
679, 706.
Paradoxically, the Committee Report accompanying the Senate bill acknowledged
that the safe harbor is based on the bespeaks caution doctrine as articulated in the Third
Circuit’s In re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation, 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993),
which opinion affirmed dismissal of a complaint alleging that the issuer did not believe its
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the Conference Committee, and the modified version prevailed after heated
debate77 and President Clinton’s veto,78 which Congress overrode.79 Thus the final
form of the statute that enacted Prong One and Prong Two disjunctively had broad
bipartisan support,80 despite the original sentiment in the Senate that the issuer’s
state of mind ought to be relevant to safe harbor protection.81
own forward-looking statements. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 17 (quoting Trump court’s
articulation of the doctrine).
77. A number of members of Congress argued vehemently against a safe harbor that
did not import a state of mind requirement. See 141 CONG. REC. 38,211 (1995) (statement of
Sen. Boxer) (describing the safe harbor as a “pirate’s cove” for “sharks and barracudas”);
141 CONG. REC. 37,804 (1995) (statement of Rep. Collins) (portraying the safe harbor as an
injustice to Americans, which would allow them to “fall victim to corporate misconduct and
fraud” by “unethical corporate wolves”); 141 CONG. REC. 37,799 (1995) (statement of Rep.
Markey) (calling it “simply wrong” to enact a safe harbor that permits issuers to
“intentionally lie to the investing public”); 141 CONG. REC. 35,299 (1995) (statement of Sen.
Biden) (calling “outrageous” the proposal to enact a safe harbor without an inquiry into
intent); 141 CONG. REC. 35,243 (1995) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes) (noting that under the
safe harbor as proposed “fraudulent statements will receive protection under the Federal
securities laws”); 141 CONG. REC. 17,432 (1995) (statement of Sen. Wellstone) (describing
safe harbor as an open invitation to “crooked corporations . . . to promise the Sun, Moon, and
stars in their forward-looking statements”); 141 CONG. REC. 17,427 (1995) (comments of
Sen. Cohen) (expressing concern that “a few carefully placed disclaimers could provide a
legal protection for misleading statements that were made knowingly”); see also 141 CONG.
REC. 35,283 (1995) (statement of Sen. Boxer) (stating that “any swindler can . . . make some
cautionary statement about a forward-looking prediction, and find cover in this new safe
harbor”).
78. In his veto message, President Clinton said,
[W]hile I support the language of the Conference Report providing a “safe
harbor” for companies that include meaningful cautionary statements in their
projections of earnings, the [Conference Report’s] Statement of Managers—
which will be used by courts as a guide to the intent of the Congress with
regard to the meaning of the bill—attempts to weaken the cautionary language
that the bill itself requires.
Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2210, 2210–11 (Dec. 19,
1995).
79. Eighty-nine Democrats voted with 230 Republicans in the House to override the
President’s veto. In the Senate, twenty Democratic senators joined forty-eight Republicans in
supporting the override. Lynne Bolduc, A Case Without a Client: The Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, FED. LAW., May 1996, at 33, 35; see also John W. Avery,
Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335 (1996) (discussing the legislative
enactment of the PSLRA step by step). And, for more on the political will behind the final
version, see Wang, supra note 7.
80. The Securities and Exchange Commission also supported the statute as enacted. See
141 CONG. REC. 38,323 (1995).
81. The Senate Report accompanying the PSLRA naturally includes statements to the
effect that the issuer’s state of mind must be considered in affording safe harbor protection
for forward-looking statements. For example: “Although the Committee believes that market
discipline will most likely provide sufficient disincentives for using the safe harbor as a
‘license to lie,’ the safe harbor does not protect forward-looking statements ‘knowingly
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Indeed, the only language that purports to require an analysis of the issuer’s
intent in this connection is in the Report’s discussion, here quoted in full, of Prong
Two, sometimes known as the the actual knowledge prong:
The second prong of the safe harbor provides an alternative analysis.
This safe harbor also applies to both written and oral forward-looking
statements. Instead of examining the forward-looking and cautionary
statements, this prong of the safe harbor focuses on the state of mind of
the person making the forward-looking statement. A person or business
entity will not be liable in a private lawsuit for a forward-looking
statement unless a plaintiff proves that person or business entity made a
false or misleading forward-looking statement with actual knowledge
that it was false or misleading. The Conference Committee intends for
this alternative prong of the safe harbor to apply if the plaintiff fails to
prove the forward-looking statement (1) if made by a natural person,
was made with the actual knowledge by that person that the statement
was false or misleading; or (2) if made by a business entity, was made
by or with the approval of an executive officer of the entity with actual
knowledge by that officer that the statement was false or misleading.82
The Report’s last sentence quoted above might have been more helpful had it
more patently set out the domain of the second prong of the safe harbor, rather than
simply echoing the text of the statute’s heightened scienter standard for forwardlooking statements not accompanied by meaningful cautionary language.
Nevertheless, the paragraph as a whole reinforces the disjunctive quality of the safe
harbor’s two prongs. Only when taken out of context might a statement such as the
third sentence of the paragraph quoted above be read to imply that the safe harbor’s
two prongs are cumulative. Thus, the rule in Schaffer is flatly prohibited.
Turning to Asher and SeeBeyond, bolstering the conclusion that the legislature
expressly intended to exclude consideration of the issuer’s (1) good faith in
connection with forward-looking statements or (2) reasonable factual basis for its
risk factors, the Senate Report attendant to the PSLRA observes that SEC Rule
175—which does contemplate a good faith and reasonable basis inquiry—had
failed to provide “meaningful protection from litigation.”83 Admittedly, nothing in
the text of the safe harbor mandates a finding that the issuer’s cautionary statements
are meaningful per Prong One—and so that the case (or portion of the case) may be
dismissed as a matter of law—at the dismissal stage, as opposed to the summary
judgment stage as suggested by the court in Asher.84 However, early dismissal so as

made with the expectation, purpose, and actual intent of misleading investors.’” S. REP. NO.
104-98, at 18.
82. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 44 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 743 (emphasis added).
83. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 16.
84. The Senate Report expressly contemplates application of the safe harbor at the
summary judgment stage. Id. at 18. However, this is because the Senate version of the bill
included “good faith” and “reasonable basis” considerations. The Senate’s version of the
safe harbor was never promulgated. Instead, the Conference Committee adopted its own
version of the PSLRA, incorporating the safe harbor as we know it, along with the
admonitions in its Report to avoid looking into issuer intent. See Avery, supra note 79.
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to avoid protracted and expensive discovery comports with the overall thrust of the
reforms sought to be accomplished by the PSLRA.
B. Flaws in the Errant Subset of Safe Harbor Decisions
The statute’s legislative history is abundantly precise and directive with regard
to how Prong One is to operate. This specific congressional intent is reinforced by
the broader goals behind the PSLRA, which is widely understood to have had as its
genesis a desire to reduce if not eliminate abusive private securities fraud litigation
practices, including: “the routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of securities and
others whenever there is a significant change in an issuer’s stock price, without
regard to any underlying culpability of the issuer, and with only faint hope that the
discovery process might lead eventually to some plausible cause of action,” and
“the abuse of the discovery process to impose costs so burdensome that it is often
economical for the [defendants] to settle.”85 The safe harbor is one of the
procedural and substantive reforms comprising the PSLRA that is targeted at
ameliorating this perceived problem.86
As we have seen, the Schaffer, SeeBeyond, and Asher opinions are supported by
neither the plain text of Prong One nor by the legislative history of the PSLRA. So
where did these cases go wrong and why? Though their intellectual approaches are
slightly different, the jurisprudential root of each of the decisions in Schaffer,
SeeBeyond, and Asher is clear. At the hub of these three opinions sits the prePSLRA bespeaks caution doctrine.
1. Specific Analytical Deficiencies
Though it provides no rationale for the exception it articulates, Schaffer
improperly conflates Prong One and the bespeaks caution doctrine.87 SeeBeyond
and Asher, and their progeny, have the same effect but do so with a more subtle
approach, using the mantle of statutory interpretation to effectuate results more

85. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31.
86. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
87. There is no dispute that the statutory safe harbor is based in part upon the bespeaks
caution doctrine. Indeed, the Statement of Managers within the Conference Committee
Report accompanying the PSLRA explicitly states, “The Conference Committee safe harbor,
like the Senate safe harbor, is based on aspects of SEC Rule 175 and the judicial [sic] created
‘bespeaks caution’ doctrine.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 43. The Conference Report also
emphasizes that the statutory safe harbor is not intended “to replace the judicial ‘bespeaks
caution’ doctrine or to foreclose further development of that doctrine by the courts.” Id. at
46; see also O’Hare, supra note 7, at 620, 638–40 (“[T]he bespeaks caution doctrine and the
statutory safe harbor offer issuers two separate, though related, protections from liability
stemming from forward-looking statements.”).
SEC Rule 175, even more limited in scope, applies to documents filed with the
Commission and provides limited immunity for forward-looking statements. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.175 (2010). Like the bespeaks caution doctrine, Rule 175’s safe harbor does not
extend to forward-looking statements that are shown to have been “made or reaffirmed
without a reasonable basis” or which were “disclosed other than in good faith.” See 17
C.F.R. § 240.3b-6(a) (2010).
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consistent with the bespeaks caution doctrine than is intended by the statutory safe
harbor. The remainder of this Part critiques these approaches.
a. The Problem with Schaffer and Similar Case Law
The Schaffer opinion, as mentioned earlier, is one of a number of district court
opinions that essentially collapse the two prongs of the safe harbor. Where a
plaintiff class convincingly pleads fraudulent intent, these courts refuse to apply the
first prong of the safe harbor to dismiss that portion of the case notwithstanding the
presence of meaningful cautionary statements, without much or any explanation.
The Schaffer opinion cites no authority, nor does it mention the bespeaks caution
doctrine.88 It is possible that the court misread the disjunctive nature of the statute
or considered portions of the legislative history out of context. Equally plausible is
that the court simply rankled at the prospect of dismissing a case in which there
was an indication that the defendants used their forward-looking statements to
perpetrate a fraud.
The most likely cause of its error, though, is that the court actually applied the
familiar bespeaks caution doctrine out of habit and without citation, assuming the
statutory safe harbor was a straight codification thereof.89 Other courts that utilize
the Schaffer approach to allegedly fraudulent forward-looking statements do tend to
cite, in the same breath, to the statutory safe harbor and the older common law
bespeaks caution doctrine that underpins the PSLRA’s safe harbor.90

88. Shaffer v. Evolving Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1223 (D. Colo. 1998).
89. The court’s statement, “Plaintiffs correctly argue that the safe harbor provision
provides no refuge for Defendants who make statements with ‘actual knowledge’ of their
falsity,” indicates that the court may have just misread the disjunctive nature of the statutory
safe harbor, perhaps informed by its own understanding of the older bespeaks caution
doctrine. Id. at 1224.
90. See, e.g., In re Alliance Pharm. Corp. Sec. Litig., 279 F. Supp. 2d 171, 192
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[N]either the bespeaks caution doctrine nor the Safe Harbor provision of
the PSLRA protects a defendant from liability if a statement was knowingly false when
made [even if defendants gave adequate warnings].”); In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC
Sec. Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 741, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that the bespeaks caution
doctrine does not protect forward-looking statements sub judice because “[n]o degree of
cautionary language will protect material misrepresentations or omissions where defendants
knew their statements were false when made” and also, similarly, under the PSLRA that
“plaintiffs have pled that the forward-looking statement was made with actual knowledge of
its falsity. . . . Such allegations render the statements actionable”); cf. In re Duane Reade Inc.
Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 6478 (NRB), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21319, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
25, 2003) (citing In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 133, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), a
pre-PSLRA case).
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b. The Problem with SeeBeyond, Asher, and Similar Case Law91
SeeBeyond and Asher interpret the term “meaningful” to require a factual
inquiry into the issuer’s state of mind or subjective environment. Like Schaffer, the
Asher court cites no authority for its interpretation of the first prong of the safe
harbor,92 nor does it acknowledge or make any attempt to distinguish contrary
results in other circuits.93 For its part, SeeBeyond misunderstands the precedent it
does cite.94 In the end, both SeeBeyond and Asher simply chart their own courses
out of the safe harbor, each interpreting the word “meaningful” in a slightly
different but functionally similar way. The SeeBeyond court reads it to say that no
statement of caution accompanying a fraudulent forward-looking statement can be
meaningful, in the most basic sense of that term, if it does not articulate the ways in
which the forward-looking statement is deceptive.95 Asher reads it to say that

91. Unsurprisingly, a good number of courts within the Seventh Circuit, typified by
Ong ex rel. Ong Ira v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 388 F. Supp. 2d 871 (N.D. Ill. 2004), follow
the Asher rule. More alarmingly, however, a number of district courts outside the Seventh
Circuit have also followed Asher’s lead. See case cited infra note 164.
92. Though not cited therein, the basis for Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Asher is
reminiscent of a Seventh Circuit precedent predating the statutory safe harbor’s enactment.
See Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1333 n.8 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[P]redictions
that don’t pan out can lead to Rule 10b-5 liability only if the prediction was unreasonable in
light of the information available at the time the statement was made.” (emphasis added)
(citing Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1132 (7th Cir. 1993))).
93. The seminal case articulating the rule that an issuer’s cautionary language need not
“mention the factor that ultimately belies a forward-looking statement” is Harris v. Ivax
Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 807 (11th Cir. 1999). See also Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540,
558 (6th Cir. 2001); In re XM Satellite Radio Holdings Sec. Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 165,
177–78 (D.D.C. 2007); Yellen v. Hake, 437 F. Supp. 2d 941, 964–66 (S.D. Iowa 2006).
94. The SeeBeyond court misunderstands acknowledged dicta from a Ninth Circuit
opinion, disagrees with it, and then articulates a rule that can only have been inspired by the
Supreme Court’s Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991), which
predated the enactment of the PSLRA. The Court in Virginia Bankshares affirmed a jury’s
finding, in a proxy case, that directors of a company fraudulently opined that a proposed
freeze out merger price was fair to shareholders, where the directors knew that the price was
unfair. The Court engaged in a good deal of discussion about the facts and beliefs implied by
an opinion. On the effect of cautionary facts disclosed along with the misleading statement
of opinion, the Court ventured that they might render the statement of opinion inactionable,
but cautioned that “not every mixture with the true will neutralize the deceptive.” Id. at 1097.
To the extent that Virginia Bankshares might have been read to require courts to look at the
good faith or honest belief a corporate issuer of securities, as an entity, has in its publicly
disclosed projections and predictions, it was superseded by Prong One of the PSLRA’s safe
harbor.
95. In re SeeBeyond Techs. Corp. Sec. Litig., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1165 (C.D. Cal.
2003) (“If the forward-looking statement is made with actual knowledge that it is false or
misleading, the accompanying cautionary language can only be meaningful if it either states
the belief of the speaker that it is false or misleading or, at the very least, clearly articulates
the reasons why it is false or misleading. These are undeniably ‘important factors that could
cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement . . . .’”);
see also Beck, supra note 7, at 200–01.
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cautionary language accompanying forward-looking statements cannot be
meaningful if the issuer does not refer to—not just “important factors that could
cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking
statement” as required by the statute—but instead “the principal or important risks
[of deviations from expectations]”96 that actually faced the company at the time it
made the projection.97
While they do not cite to either, both SeeBeyond and Asher echo the bespeaks
caution doctrine and its regulatory half-sister, Rule 3b-6—the SEC’s safe harbor
rule for projections—which is applicable only to filings with the Commission.98
Rule 3b-6 expressly incorporates, inter alia, a “good faith” component as well as a
“sound factual basis” component. Many courts applying the bespeaks caution
doctrine outside the context of SEC filings have also incorporated these two
concepts.99 Interestingly, SeeBeyond (good faith) and Asher (sound factual basis)

96. Asher v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2004).
97. We need not guess at Judge Easterbrook’s rationale or his own views on corporate
disclosure and statutory construction. In fact, his views have been clearly articulated in other
forums. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 302 (1991) (expressing concern that firms cannot know until sometime
after their disclosures whether or not they were sufficient, proper, and within the boundaries
of existing law); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994) (“When the text has no answer, a
court should not put one there on the basis of legislative reports or moral philosophy—or
economics! Instead the interpreter should go to some other source of rules, including
administrative agencies, common law, and private decision.”). Judge Easterbrook posits that
statutes either resolve a problem with a clear rule or they invite the development of common
law by judges. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983).
Further, he argues, where it is clear that the legislature sought to “pursue[] Goal X by Rule
Y,” the role of the judge is not to preempt the legislature’s selection of the rule. Id. at 546.
The PSLRA generally and the text of the safe harbor provision in particular, as informed by
the display of unusual bipartisan will behind enacting this legislation in an effort to reduce
expensive strike suits (overriding the President’s veto), appear to reflect Congress’s choice
to use this set of both substantive and procedural rules to accomplish that goal. Instead,
Judge Easterbrook seizes on the arguably ambiguous word “meaningful” as a portal to
judicial construction of the type he so vehemently warns against, that which sets aside a rule
chosen by the legislature. This is especially curious in this particularly setting, where his
decision paves the way for discovery. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69
B.U. L. REV. 635 (1989) (comparing discovery to trench warfare in World War I).
98. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (2010); cf. Homer Kripke, Rule 10b-5 Liability and
“Material” “Facts,” 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061, 1075 (1971) (advocating, in light of the
vagaries of defining materiality and even what constitutes a fact in the context of securities
disclosures in which accounting treatment figures prominently and the SEC takes differing
stances on liability depending on whether it speaks for sellers or buyers, the following
standard: “[W]hether, after reasonable investigation under the circumstances, the persons
accused of misrepresentation reasonably believed that the presentation which they made was
a fair one” (emphasis omitted)).
99. See, e.g., In re Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. Sec. Litig., 163 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir.
1998); Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir. 1995); Exeter
Bancorporation, Inc. v. Kemper Sec. Grp., Inc., 58 F.3d 1306, 1313 (8th Cir. 1995); Kowal
v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Isquith v. Middle S. Utils.,

622

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 86:595

map loosely onto these two considerations. They are, nonetheless, inapt to analysis
of the application of the PSLRA’s statutory safe harbor.
2. Differences Between the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine and the Statutory Safe
Harbor Render Resort to the Doctrine Inappropriate
While there is nothing wrong with use of the bespeaks caution doctrine in some
circumstances, in the particular context of a motion to dismiss brought under Prong
One of the statutory safe harbor—in a case where the forward-looking disclosures
were allegedly fraudulently made—the bespeaks caution doctrine is inapposite
from logical, theoretical, and practical perspectives. First, as a statutory matter, the
safe harbor supersedes the bespeaks caution doctrine within its realm. And, the
theoretical bases for the two constructs are different. Finally, as a practical matter,
the use of the bespeaks caution doctrine enables and even encourages undesirable
hindsight bias.
a. Distinctions in Domain and Analytical Underpinning
The statutory safe harbor and the bespeaks caution doctrine are both liabilitylimiting constructs, but they differ in material respects. First, the safe harbor is
more restricted—applying only in the context of private securities litigation—to
certain defined types of statements, made by enumerated entities, and subject to a
number of exclusions.100 By definition, the statute prevails in the quite limited field
in which it reigns. The bespeaks caution doctrine may apply in all other situations
in which liability for projections is at issue, and therefore it is broader in its overall
scope.101
On the one hand, the bespeaks caution doctrine, as applied in many courts,
expressly contemplates consideration of the speakers’ good faith and reasonable
factual basis for their projections.102 These fact-intensive matters will typically
require discovery, precluding early dismissal based on this defense. On the other
hand, the statutory safe harbor is potentially more powerful than the bespeaks
caution doctrine, contemplating as it does an early ruling that meaningful

Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 204 (5th Cir. 1988); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 776 (3d Cir.
1985); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, “Firm-Specific” Information and the Federal
Securities Laws: A Doctrinal, Etymological, and Theoretical Critique, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1409
(1994) (discussing the use, in suits based on forward-looking disclosures made outside SEC
filings, of Rule 3b-6–like reasoning).
100. The safe harbor explicitly excludes from protection forward-looking statements
included in financial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles, statements contained in registration statements, or statements made in connection
with a tender offer or initial public offering. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(b)(2) (2006). Further, for
instance, the statutory safe harbor does not apply to entities with a recent history of securities
fraud. Id. § 78u-5(b)(1)(A).
101. It has something of an inverse relationship to the “buried facts” doctrine. See Kohn
v. Am. Metal Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp 1331, 1362–65 (E.D. Pa. 1970), modified, 458 F.2d
255 (3d Cir. 1972).
102. See supra note 99.
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cautionary statements immunize an issuer’s projections without regard to
contemporaneous intent.
The conceptual foundations for the two concepts differ. Court opinions based on
the bespeaks caution doctrine express different rationales for it and the result it
dictates.103 Some courts have noted that at its core the doctrine is simply an
approach to determining whether or not forward-looking disclosures are materially
misleading.104 Other courts have viewed the doctrine as implicating the reliance
element of the 10b-5 claim, namely that no investor would reasonably rely on
predictions that are tempered with admonitory language.105 Last, led by the Third
Circuit’s oft-cited In re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation,106 many
courts applying the doctrine conclude that cautionary language renders predictions
and projections immaterial.107
Unlike the bespeaks caution doctrine, which is not only more expansive in terms
of its application but which also may be both urged and applied from three distinct
theoretical perspectives, Prong One of the statutory safe harbor is expressly rooted
in Trump’s materiality analysis.108 This suggests that the determination of Prong
One’s applicability should not hinge on the definition of the term “meaningful” visà-vis the issuer crafting the cautionary statements, and even less so on exactly what
“the principal risks” were that the issuer faced at the time it crafted and delivered
the cautionary language accompanying its forward-looking statements. Instead, the
court’s analytical goal should be to conduct a “careful and contextual”109 reading of
the forward-looking statements and their accompanying cautionary language to
determine whether, considered together, they materially mislead a reasonable
investor and therefore are actionable. This argument is discussed further in Part V.

103. See generally Langevoort, supra note 1, at 483 (discussing, in passim, the three
different rationales and noting that, at least in its infancy, the doctrine is “more a collection
of cases linked by a common phrase or quotation than a set of analytically homogeneous
holdings”); O’Hare, supra note 7, at 647–53 (discussing separately the “false or misleading,”
“materiality,” and “reliance” versions of the bespeaks caution doctrine).
104. See, e.g., Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, 949 F.2d 243, 245 (8th Cir. 1991); I. Meyers
Pincus & Assocs., P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991); Romani v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1991).
105. See, e.g., In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1414 (9th Cir. 1994)
(citing unreasonableness of reliance as one basis for a finding that forward-looking
disclosures bespeak caution and are therefore inactionable); Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d
160, 167 (5th Cir. 1994) (same).
106. 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993).
107. See also Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin Assocs., Ltd., 45 F.3d 399 (11th Cir.
1995).
108. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 44 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 743 (noting, after pointing out the irrelevance of the issuer’s state of mind to the
determination of the first prong’s application, that “[c]ourts may continue to find a forwardlooking statement immaterial—and thus not actionable . . . —on other grounds”); see also
Beck, supra note 7, at 194–96 (noting the influence of Trump’s materiality analysis on
legislative deliberations preceding the enactment of the PSLRA); O’Hare, supra note 7, at
641 (addressing the legislative history in support).
109. Langevoort, supra note 1, at 503.
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b. Subjective Inquiry Promotes Fraud-by-Hindsight
The approach taken in Schaffer, SeeBeyond, and Asher encourages the hindsight
bias that muddies the distinction between fraud and innocent error or
misrepresentation.110 Predictions of uncertain future events will often prove to be
wrong.111 Given what we know about the prevalence of the safe harbor defense,
predictions that fail to materialize in fact drive most private securities litigation
today. This raises two possibilities. Either plaintiffs see fraud ex post, building a
weak case around dashed expectations, or, in anticipation of the safe harbor
defense, plaintiffs allege not only that contrary facts existed at the time of the
forward-looking statements but also allege facts that they hope will demonstrate
management was aware of the contrary circumstances.112 It stands to reason that the
more facts are emphasized in connection with the motion to dismiss, the more
likely a plaintiff class will be able to use inferences only made possible by
hindsight to bootstrap itself past a motion to dismiss.113 Unfortunately, this is
probably happening more often than it should in the district courts.114
Thus, the interjection into the statute of a subjective inquiry into the issuer’s
state of mind or environmental circumstances is not only contrary to the purview of
the statute and theoretically unsound, it also encourages a form of fraud-byhindsight—something the federal courts have so often rejected.115 But before

110. Gulati et al., supra note 75.
111. See, e.g., Raab v. Gen. Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 1993); Gulati et al.,
supra note 75. The Senate Report quoted a letter from a large institutional investor: “A major
failing of the existing safe harbor [Rule 175] is that while it may provide theoretical
protection to issuers from liability when disclosing projections, it fails to prevent the threat
of frivolous lawsuits that arises every time a legitimate projection is not realized.” S. REP.
NO. 104-98, at 16 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 695.
112. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
113. Langevoort, supra note 1, at 494 (“Courts pass judgment moreover, knowing that
this particular reliance was indeed unwise. In hindsight, it is easy to find fault with reliance
on self-interested others.”).
114. In re Compuware Securities Litigation, 301 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Mich. 2004), and
In re FirstEnergy Corp. Securities Litigation, 316 F. Supp. 2d 581 (N.D. Ohio 2004),
provide good examples of cases in which the plaintiffs successfully bootstrap allegations of
defendants’ actual knowledge of incorrect facts or assumptions into a finding that the
putative meaningful cautionary statements issued by defendants were not meaningful. While
not an exact parallel to the Seventh Circuit’s Asher, this type of reasoning is the danger the
Asher ruling enables and encourages.
115. E.g., Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 264 F.3d 1245, 1260 (10th Cir. 2001)
(“[A]llegations that the defendant possessed knowledge of facts that are later determined by
a court to have been material, without more, is not sufficient to demonstrate that the
defendant intentionally withheld those facts from, or recklessly disregarded the importance
of those facts to, a company’s shareholders in order to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”);
Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 309 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[A]llegations that defendants should
have anticipated future events and made certain disclosures earlier than they actually did do
not suffice to make out a claim of securities fraud.”); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180
F.3d 525, 538 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Rule 10b-5 liability does not attach merely because ‘[a]t one
time the firm bathes itself in a favorable light’ but ‘[l]ater the firm discloses that things are
less rosy.’” (quoting DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990)), abrogated
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determining that the Schaffer, SeeBeyond, and Asher decisions are fatally flawed,
let us review some relevant policy considerations to assess whether there is any
other normative support for the jurisprudential detour these cases have established.
IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS
We have reviewed the text of the statute and its legislative history, which
together make clear Congress’s purpose to block the road taken by Schaffer,
SeeBeyond, and Asher. We also have considered the weakness of the
Schaffer/SeeBeyond/Asher approach from an analytical standpoint and the
additional hindsight burden this perspective creates. Now we move to a more
normative analysis of the Schaffer and SeeBeyond/Asher results. The following
subparts review some additional policy considerations surrounding the PSLRA,
concluding that despite the perhaps counterintuitive nature of a strict application of
Prong One, this is exactly how courts must apply it.
A. The Tradeoff Between Ad Hoc Adjudication and a Statutory Presumption
Legal scholars have sometimes, like those conducting statistical analysis,
divided errors into two types.116 A type I error is the error of rejecting a true
hypothesis, one that should have been accepted.117 A type II error is the error of
accepting a hypothesis that should have been rejected.118 Whether a type I error is
preferable to a type II error in this context is discussed below, but first let us use
this rubric to assess the validity of the dismissal of a securities fraud complaint
based on the safe harbor, in the setting where predictions and projections turn out to
be incorrect or the plans or objectives of management change—in other words, in
those cases where litigation is likely to ensue. Table 1, which follows, categorizes
the possible legal outcomes in terms of type I and type II errors. Note that where
the predictions or projections—or the plans and objectives of management—turn
out to be correct, or they in fact materialize as disclosed, there is no liability trigger,
by Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Dura
Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) (“The securities statutes seek to maintain
public confidence in the marketplace. They do so by deterring fraud, in part, through the
availability of private securities fraud actions. But the statutes make these latter actions
available, not to provide investors with broad insurance against market losses, but to protect
them against those economic losses that misrepresentations actually cause.” (citations
omitted)).
116. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking—
Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 25–30 (1985) (discussing tradeoff
between type I and type II errors in the context of invalidation of a fiduciary’s good faith
decision on the one hand, and validation of bad faith decisions on the other); see also Robert
E. Thomas, Debugging Software Patents: Increasing Innovation and Reducing Uncertainty
in the Judicial Reform of Software Patent Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 191, 236 n.336 (citing RICHARD J. LARSEN & MORRIS L. MARX, AN INTRODUCTION TO
MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 299 (2d ed. 1986)).
117. Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 711 (1996) (discussing false positives and false negatives
as they relate to the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA).
118. Id.
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that is, no securities fraud suit would be filed regardless of whether either scienter
or meaningful cautionary language was present or absent. Accordingly, in this
setting, the relevant variables are the issuer’s intent to defraud and the issuer’s
effort to utilize the safe harbor by supplying cautionary statements.
Table 1. Validity of dismissal of securities fraud complaint based on the
PSLRA’s safe harbor, considering the presence of cautionary
statements (MCS), and the issuer’s actual intent.

Intent to defraud present

Intent to defraud absent

Safe Harbor
Inapplicable
(i.e., no MCS ∴
no dismissal)

Intent to defraud + no MCS
= true positive
(i.e., scienter, case not
dismissed)

No intent to defraud +
no MCS
= false positive
(i.e., no scienter, yet case
not dismissed)
type I error

Safe Harbor
Applies
(i.e., MCS ∴
case dismissed)

Intent to defraud + MCS
= false negative
(i.e., scienter, but case
dismissed)
type II error

No intent to defraud + MCS
= true negative
(i.e., no scienter and
case dismissed)

This table demonstrates that in the context of motions to dismiss based on the
PSLRA safe harbor, the false positive (type I error) is denial of the motion to
dismiss when the issuer has no intent to defraud, and the false negative (type II
error) is granting the motion to dismiss when the securities issuer intends to
defraud.
Finding an innocent person guilty is a classic type I error, while acquitting a
guilty person is a type II error.119 Using what we know about this most “axiomatic
and elementary” legal principle—the presumption of innocence until guilt is
proven120—we could assume that our legal system generally prefers type II errors
over type I errors.121

119. Cf. Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A
Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92 MICH. L. REV. 2088, 2118 (1994) (calling the likelihood
of finding an innocent trade based on inside information a type I error, and calling the
likelihood of finding a trade based on inside information to be an innocent trade a type II
error).
120. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453–56 (1895) (“Blackstone (1753–1765)
maintains that ‘the law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one
innocent suffer.’” (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352)).
121. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 116, at 38 (discussing the law’s propensity to create
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In the criminal arena, this preference is justified. A look at the outcomes and
associated costs provides the rationale for the criminal (both substantive and
procedural) laws’ preference for eliminating type I error. An innocent person found
guilty faces loss of her liberty or perhaps even her life; both of these are deemed to
be far more valuable than any general loss of faith in the legal system and its
constitutional protections that might be engendered by the occasional acquittal of a
known guilty person.
But type I error is not always preferred over type II.122 Indeed, commentators
have noted that the decreased burden of proof in the general civil context exhibits a
preference for limiting type II error, perhaps at the expense of an increase in type I
error.123 And, presumably, error reduction in itself is not a goal. But as legislation
inevitably balances the interests of various constituencies, it is likely that one goal
will be advanced at the expense of another—hence the type I/type II analysis here.
Professor Stout considers hypothesis rejection in her critique of the PSLRA’s
heightened pleading standards.124 She argues that the PSLRA wrongly targeted
reduction of type I errors at the expense of increasing type II errors because
Congress failed to consider the relative costs of each type of error.125 By Professor
Stout’s rough calculations, the loss of investor confidence caused by unremedied
fraud in the marketplace (type II error) is approximately 100 billion dollars, far
greater than the cost of strike suits (type I error), which many have estimated to be
in the hundreds of millions of dollars.126 While she concedes that strike suits are
problematic, she ultimately suggests that the lead plaintiff provision of the PSLRA
is the better method of reducing the incidence of strike suits in the civil securities
fraud arena.127 Implicit in her argument is that the PSLRA’s heightened pleading
bright line rules designed to create certainty and to eliminate type I error at the expense of
increased type II error, in the context of fiduciaries’ opportunism).
122. Just using common sense, we can intuit several situations outside the law in which
it would be far more important to minimize type II errors than type I. In the instance of
airport screening for weapons, we would prefer to endure the additional delay and invasion
of privacy associated with a full-scale search of our carry-on luggage than bear the thought
that more lax screening might permit a terrorist to bring a deadly weapon onboard. And in
the field of medical diagnostics, type I errors—after which additional testing can reveal the
false nature of the initially positive result—generally are also preferred over type II errors,
which are likely to give the patient a false sense of security and result in his foregoing
necessary medical treatment. We see that in both of these cases, the cost of a false negative
can be much higher than the cost of a false positive.
123. Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct?
Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 698
(1993) (explaining scientists’ general preference for type II errors over type I and discussing
these in the context of burdens of proof).
124. Stout, supra note 117, at 714–15.
125. Professor Stout assessed direct costs of false positives and false negatives.
Understandably, she made no attempt to assess error costs using the traditional formula,
which would involve assessment of the probability of error and the magnitude of error, as
well as the fraction of defendants who are actually liable and the total quantity of litigation.
See generally Thomas R. Lee, Pleading and Proof: The Economics of Legal Burdens, 1997
BYU L. REV. 1, 5.
126. Stout, supra note 117, at 714–15.
127. Id.
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standards for private securities suits are wrongheaded because they improperly
prefer to eliminate type I error rather than costlier type II error.
Professor Stout’s law-and-economics-based arguments raise two interrelated
points. First, her rough cost comparison is convincing, if her estimate of a reduction
in the value of the market capitalization of one percent due to type II errors128 is
even close to accurate. However, while this calculation may be well-suited to
analysis of the costs of the heightened pleading standard, her thesis (Congress’s
preference to eliminate type I errors rather than type II errors is misguided) does
not persuade in—nor does she attempt to extend it to cover—the context of the safe
harbor for forward-looking statements. That is because the safe harbor provision
was not targeted solely at reduction in strike suits as were many of the other
substantive and procedural provisions of the PSLRA.129 Instead it had another
express purpose, that of promoting corporate disclosure of forward-looking
information.130
Second, Professor Stout’s argument strengthens the supposition made earlier
that the policy considerations as articulated by the legislative history should
control. In fact, based on the legislative history of the PSLRA, we know that the
purpose of the safe harbor was to encourage disclosure of forward-looking
information by reducing the very real threat of expensive litigation (regardless of
its outcome). This purpose was clearly expressed by both chambers of Congress,
with the support of the SEC.131 In other words, Congress was seeking, with Prong

128. Id. at 714.
129. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(2)(A) (new standards for establishing a class); id.
§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(v), (a)(8) (selection of lead plaintiff’s counsel); id. § 77z-1(a)(2)(A)
(heightened pleading requirements); id. § 77z-1(b) (discovery stays); id. § 77z-1(c)(2)
(mandatory sanctions for improper pleading); id. § 77z-2(c)(1)(B)(i) (restriction of joint and
several liability to those with actual knowledge of misrepresentations).
130. The safe harbor’s unique contribution to the PSLRA’s policy goal was doublebarreled. Prong One would both reduce the costs of frivolous litigation and increase the flow
of useful information into the capital markets. As the Conference Committee Report’s
Statement of Managers further elaborates, in a section entitled “The muzzling effect of
abusive securities litigation”:
Abusive litigation severely affects the willingness of corporate managers to
disclose information to the marketplace. . . . “Shareholders are also damaged
due to the chilling effect of the current system on the robustness and candor of
disclosure. . . . Understanding a company’s own assessment of its future
potential would be among the most valuable information shareholders and
potential investors could have about a firm.”
Fear that inaccurate projections will trigger the filing of securities class
action lawsuit has muzzled corporate management.
....
The Conference Committee has adopted a statutory “safe harbor” to
enhance market efficiency by encouraging companies to disclose forwardlooking information.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 42–43 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
741–42 (quoting a former SEC chair).
131. See id. at 43. The Senate Report accompanying the initial version of the PSLRA
speaks similarly:
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One, to eliminate the type I errors that were “muzzling” corporate managers.132 The
statute’s major provisions thus included both procedural and substantive elements
designed to enable courts to swiftly dismiss unmeritorious claims,133 eliminating
extortionate discovery and restoring some balance to private securities litigation,
the costs of which Congress determined were out of control and injurious to the
investing public and “the entire U.S. economy.”134
Perhaps only coincidentally, the safe harbor itself is also both procedural and
substantive. Procedurally, it gives courts the tool with which to “acquit” those who
employ the safe harbor—whether innocent or guilty135—without subjecting them to
the protracted litigation that would have ensued otherwise. This procedural tool
then permits the attainment of the provision’s twin substantive goals: reduction in
meritless suits and increase in corporate disclosure. Thus, it is apparent that in order
to promote increased corporate disclosure (i.e., to eliminate type I errors) and at the
same time to reduce frivolous suits and abusive litigation practices, Congress was
willing to tolerate some type II error. And where Congress has made a clear policy
choice, it is not for the courts to override that.136
In short, we must not overlook the value of forward-looking information to the
marketplace when assessing how the first prong of the safe harbor should be
Private securities class actions under 10b-5 inhibit free and open
communication among management, analysts, and investors. This has caused
corporate management to refrain from providing shareholders forward-looking
information about companies. . . . As a result, investors often receive less, not
more, information, which makes investing more risky and increases the cost of
raising capital.
S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 5 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 684.
The SEC also supported a law that would encourage forward-looking disclosures by
securities issuers. See Safe Harbor for Forward Looking Statements, Sec. Act Release No.
33,7101 [1994–95 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,436 (Oct. 13, 1994). For a
good review of the Commission’s varying stances on the advisability of issuers disclosing
forward-looking information, see Beck, supra note 7. For a more detailed history and
additional pointed commentary, see generally HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979).
132. The Supreme Court has also explicitly acknowledged that a primary concern of the
statute is curbing strike suits, that is, type I errors. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (describing the purpose of the PSLRA as curbing “frivolous,
lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving investors’ ability to recover on meritorious
claims”).
133. The procedural provisions include the bar on discovery, restrictions on who may
serve as lead plaintiff, lead counsel, and enhanced sanctions for abusive litigation. The
substantive provisions include, inter alia, elimination of joint and several liability and a cap
on recoverable damages. Id. at 320–21; see also Seligman, supra note 1 (outlining the
provisions of the Act).
134. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006)
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31); see also James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of
Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3, 15 (1999) (discussing the statute’s “goal of
reducing the incidence of lawyer-driven frivolous class actions”).
135. As discussed infra Part IV.B., it will not be so easy for fraudsters to take advantage
of this statutory formula for inoculating intentionally false forward-looking statements.
136. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 n.2 (1990) (“If Congress erred, . . . it is
for that body, and not [the courts], to correct its mistake.”).
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applied.137 Further affirming Congress’s preference to reduce type I error at the
expense of marginally increased type II error is the fact that the amount of type II
error to be tolerated is necessarily limited. This issue is discussed in the next
subpart.
B. The Limited Harm Caused by Type II Error
Not only is Prong One a means uniquely suited to achieve its legislative goals,
but the amount of type II error likely to occur as a result of this policy preference is
relatively limited. For purposes of this discussion, we shall assume type II error
should be minimized because in this context it is bad.138 At least on the surface, it is
bad in that it can lead to the “unseemly” result that the federal securities laws will
appear to have granted a “license to lie.”139 Though precise quantification of that
eventuality is not feasible, several arguments support the conclusion that the
number of type II errors likely to result in this context will be few.
First, there are market incentives to speak the truth.140 This is particularly true in
the realm of publicly owned companies and widely traded stocks—presumably the
precise arena in which Congress hoped to encourage more disclosure of forwardlooking information.
Second, the defense provided by Prong One is limited in its scope and
application. It relates only to specifically defined forward-looking statements, not
all forward-looking statements, and even then only when these are accompanied by
meaningful cautionary language. Enacted as it was, as part of the PSLRA, the safe
harbor applies only to private securities litigation. Within that context, the
presumption’s application is not permitted in the most risky types of investments
like IPOs and penny stock transactions.141 Further, if an issuer succeeds in using
forward-looking disclosures to defraud the market within Prong One’s narrow
domain, there is still the threat of SEC enforcement action. The SEC is not bound
by Prong One’s defense-friendly presumption of immateriality.142 Therefore, there
is still a significant deterrent present.

137. Moreover, some have argued that the deterrent effect of securities regulation is lost
when issuers face substantial threat of liability (or presumably any large financial penalty)
whether or not they have actually committed fraud. See Choi, supra note 9, at 574–75.
138. The House Report on the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 pointed out the
importance of providing investors with sufficient information to make intelligent investment
decisions: “No investor . . . can safely buy and sell securities upon the exchanges without
having an intelligent basis for forming his judgment as to the value of the securities he buys
or sells. . . . [T]he hiding and secreting of important information obstructs the operation of
the markets as indices of real value.” H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11 (1934), reprinted in 5
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1934 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar
eds., 1973).
139. Coffee, supra note 1, at 989.
140. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 18 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,
697 (“[T]he Committee believes that market discipline will most likely provide sufficient
disincentives for using the safe harbor as a ‘license to lie’ . . . .”); Langevoort, supra note 1,
at 496, 502; Talley, supra note 9, at 1958 & n.12.
141. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(i), 77z-2(c)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
142. The bespeaks caution doctrine, rather than the statutory safe harbor, applies in SEC
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And third, an issuer perpetrating a real fraud is likely to run afoul of the
securities laws in other ways. Most likely is that it will have, in committing this
fraud, also or in the alternative misstated a present or historical fact.143 Any such
misstatement would not be protected by the statutory safe harbor. Therefore, such
an issuer will be successfully prosecuted or sued irrespective of Prong One’s
application.
Given these facts, the amount of type II error—issuers in actuality abusing
Prong One successfully—is probably quite limited.
C. Prong One Is Valuable Despite Type II Error
Finally, we should not discount the value of the risk language that Prong One
does encourage. The “meaningful cautionary statement” requirement inherent in
Prong One, to pass muster, must include at least some “important factors that could
cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking
statement.”144 The interpretation given by most courts is that the issuer need not
have the prevision necessary to “explicitly mention the factor that ultimately belies
the forward looking statement.”145 Where the Asher court parts ways with the other
circuits is that the others hold this to be sufficient to allow that portion of the case
to be dismissed, so long as the risk factors disclosed are of equal magnitude as that
which ultimately causes the results to differ materially from the projection.146 This
result is consistent with the legislative history on this point.147 The rationale is that
so long as the “investor has been warned of risks of a significance similar to that
actually realized, she is sufficiently on notice of the danger of the investment to
make an intelligent decision about it according to her own preferences for risk and
reward.”148
Though the power of this risk language to adequately warn the average investor
may be debatable,149 we must assume that such risk disclosures will transmit a
enforcement actions. See SEC v. Merch. Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 767 n.18 (11th Cir.
2007). This is because the statutory safe harbor is expressly limited to “any private action
arising under this chapter.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1); SEC v. U.N. Dollars Corp., No. 01 Civ.
9059(AGS), 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1099 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2003).
143. Langevoort, supra note 1, at 501. Some have suggested that as false statements of
historical fact are excluded from safe harbor protection, an issuer’s omission of the reasons
the prediction is false might also constitute a violation of 10b-5 anyway. E.g., O’Hare, supra
note 7, at 651–54. Of course this Virginia Bankshares–inspired perspective and result
vitiates the intended prophylactic nature of Prong One, as discussed here.
144. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(i), 77z-2(c)(1)(B)(i) (2006); see supra text
accompanying note 22 (quoting the PSLRA’s safe harbor provision).
145. See, e.g., Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 807 (11th Cir. 1999).
146. Asher v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 377 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2004).
147. See H.R. REP. 104-369, at 44 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 743 (“Failure to include the particular factor that ultimately causes the forward-looking
statement not to come true will not mean that the statement is not protected by the safe
harbor.”).
148. Harris, 182 F.3d at 807.
149. See Langevoort, supra note 1, at 492–97 (arguing, inter alia, that optimistic
forward-looking messages are even more persuasive when they contain cautionary
language).
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cautionary message to at least some market participants, particularly those more
sophisticated investors who quickly absorb issuer disclosures and drive the prices
of securities.
***
Some courts, when faced with the distasteful prospect of appearing to “let a
guilty man go free,” have chosen instead to convert Prong One’s irrebuttable
presumption into a rebuttable one, and impermissibly so. Neither the circuit court
majority’s straightforward interpretation, the legislative history, nor any policy
objective supports this judicial choice. To put safe harbor jurisprudence back on its
proper course, the pitfalls exemplified by Schaffer and cases like it on the one hand,
and SeeBeyond/Asher on the other, must be avoided.
V. PRESCRIPTION FOR PROPER ASSESSMENT, UNDER SAFE HARBOR PRONG ONE, OF
ALLEGEDLY DECEITFUL FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS
Schaffer and SeeBeyond/Asher present similar but distinct analytical problems
that negatively affect safe harbor jurisprudence. But at their core, these efforts to
inject an intent inquiry into the application of the safe harbor fly directly in the face
of Congress’s intent in establishing it. Ultimately this wayward branch of safe
harbor jurisprudence represents judicial antipathy to the safe harbor’s prophylactic
effect.
As such, there may be no interpretive fix; to some the statute may simply be
internally incoherent. In the years since its enactment, litigants and courts have
continued to find ways to circumvent it, some of which are increasingly creative.150
But dislike of the statute’s effect does not make such circumvention intellectually
sound. By digging deeper into the statute and considering the safe harbor in its
specific field of application, we can develop some guiding principles that will
improve the integrity of ongoing application of the safe harbor. Used consistently,
these guidelines will go a long way toward reducing and ameliorating the
perception problem created by the type II error the statutory safe harbor introduces.
A. Avoiding Schaffer’s Flaw Requires Careful Parsing of “Mixed” Statements
Schaffer represents a category of opinions marred by loose interpretation—those
that either collapse the two prongs of the safe harbor or conflate the statutory safe
harbor and older, broader bespeaks caution concepts and authorities.151 As we
know, the bespeaks caution doctrine incorporates a good-faith, reasonable-basis
analysis. Undoubtedly this approach is more intuitively appealing, more
comfortable than that dictated by the statutory safe harbor. Indeed the bespeaks

150. See, e.g., Edward J. Goodman Life Income Trust v. Jabil Circuit, 594 F.3d 783, 794
(11th Cir. 2010) (noting that to accept as true the complaint’s allegations that defendants
knew of the falsity of their forward-looking statements, irrespective of the presence of
meaningful cautionary statements, would automatically defeat the safe harbor in an
impermissible way).
151. See supra Part II.A.
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caution doctrine may comport more generally with fundamental notions of what
constitutes fraud as well as pre-PSLRA Supreme Court jurisprudence on the subject
of misleading opinions.152 Therefore, it is understandable that some courts have
reacted favorably to misguided arguments about the issuer’s good faith and/or
reasonable basis under the statutory safe harbor. Even the appearance of a license to
lie runs counter to courts’ natural predisposition to do justice.
For courts that are overly swayed by concerns about the fact and impact of type
II error the safe harbor engenders, the most rational approach is to focus on limiting
its use to truly forward-looking statements. A court that is hesitant to apply the safe
harbor to allegedly false forward-looking statements can take some comfort in a
strict analytical approach to “mixed” statements. Corporate disclosures being as
varied as they are, both in form and substance, courts are commonly called upon to
assess mixed statements—those that contain elements that are at once forwardlooking and also capturing some element of present or historical fact.153 Courts can
and should exercise caution not to be led down a path that results in wholesale safe
harbor protection of forward-looking statements that are mixed.
Putative forward-looking statements can be mixed in two ways. They can be
substantively mixed projections that by definition incorporate present or historical
facts. Or they can be semantically mixed, that is, present-tense language used to
convey an anticipatory message, or the reverse, existing facts couched in the future
tense or using anticipatory language. Each of these types of statements must be
scrutinized closely and not mechanically. In cases involving purported forwardlooking statements that are mixed, the court will need to parse them carefully to
ascertain what portion of the statement deserves protection and what does not. To
do this, the court must actively refer to plaintiffs’ particular allegations of
falsehood.
1. Substantively Mixed Statements
A good example of the substantively mixed statement and proper treatment
thereof is found in the First Circuit’s In re Stone & Webster, Inc., Securities
Litigation.154 In that case, the court considered the forward-looking nature of the
issuer’s statement to the effect that it “has on hand . . . sufficient sources of funds to
meet its anticipated [needs].”155 The district court had apparently ruled that this
statement qualified as a projection of future economic performance. But the First
Circuit dug deeper, looking not only at the dictionary definition of the word
“projection” and the purpose of the statutory safe harbor as set out in its legislative
history, but also at the falsity alleged by the plaintiffs.156 Reasoning that the

152. See Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
153. See, e.g., Harris, 182 F.3d at 806 (discussing a mixed list containing both forwardlooking factors and non-forward-looking factors as a single “unit” or “‘statement’ in the
statutory sense,” which could provide a possible basis for liability).
154. 414 F.3d 187 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Iowa Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. MF Global,
Ltd., 620 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 2010) (instructing that forward-looking and non-forwardlooking elements of mixed disclosures are “severable”).
155. In re Stone & Webster, 414 F.3d at 212.
156. See id. at 212–13.
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defendants’ statement was comprised of two parts—one referring to the quantity of
cash on hand, and the other referring to the amount of future capital needs—the
court noted that the aspect of the statement alleged to be false was the part
portraying the presently existing fact.157 The plaintiffs, the court found, were not
contending that the issuer underestimated its future cash needs, but instead that it
was lying about its present access to funds.158 Thus, the statement was properly
excluded from safe harbor protection.159 This more critical evaluation of a mixed
statement is essential to proper application of Prong One to mixed forward-looking
statements.
2. Semantically Mixed Statements
In a similar fashion, mixed statements that employ future tense to convey a
present fact must also be analyzed quite carefully to assure they are given safe
harbor treatment only when truly forward looking. The Ninth Circuit, holding two
semantically mixed putative forward-looking statements to be not forward looking,
articulated a strong policy reason for this stricter approach to parsing mixed
statements. The disclosures for which the defendant sought safe harbor protection
in No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. America West
Holding Corp.160 were (1) a press release in which the company disclosed an FAA
settlement agreement and fine, stating that “the settlement agreement’s provisions
will not have a material adverse effect on the Company’s operations or financial
results,”161 and (2) the statement, made during a conference call with analysts:
“[W]e are not anticipating any major increase in maintenance costs or the cost of
oversights going forward as a result of [the settlement agreement].”162 Despite the
use of anticipatory language and tenor, the court found these statements to amount
simply to disclosure of the FAA fine and its “present effects” of their imposition on
the company.163 To hold otherwise, the Ninth Circuit panel said, would permit “any
corporation [to] shield itself from future exposure for past misconduct by making
present-tense statements regarding the misconduct and its effects on the

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 213; see also Institutional Investors v. Avaya, 564 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.
2009) (parsing defendants’ statement “we are on track to meet our goals for the year” and
holding that it did not incorporate current statements of fact and therefore was, in its context,
entitled to safe harbor protection); Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d
702, 705 (7th Cir. 2008) (“When [the defendant] told the world that sales of its 5500 system
were ‘still going strong,’ it was saying both that current sales were strong and that they
would continue to be so, at least for a time, since the statement would be misleading if
[defendant] knew that its sales were about to collapse. The element of prediction in saying
that sales are ‘still going strong’ does not entitle [defendant] to a safe harbor with regard to
the statement’s representation concerning current sales.”).
160. 320 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2003).
161. Id. at 936.
162. Id. (alteration in original).
163. Id. at 936–37.
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corporation.”164 Again, this deeper approach to what qualifies as a forward-looking
statement is crucial to putting safe harbor jurisprudence back on course.
3. Mixed Statements as Units of Liability
Finally, courts should be particularly wary of misreading the holding in the
Eleventh Circuit’s seminal Harris v. Ivax Corp.165 Ivax involved, in part,
allegations that a list of assumptions underlying a third-quarter forecast failed to
warn investors of the possibility of a goodwill write-down.166 In assessing what it
called the “laundry list,” which contained both present facts and projections, the
court said the following:
The mixed nature of this statement raises the question whether the
safe harbor benefits the entire statement or only parts of it. Of course, if
any of the individual sentences describing known facts (such as the
customer’s bankruptcy) were allegedly false, we could easily conclude
that that smaller, non-forward-looking statement falls outside the safe
harbor. But the allegation here is that the list as a whole misleads
anyone reading it for an explanation of Ivax’s projections, because the
list omits the expectation of a goodwill write-down. If the allegation is
that the whole list is misleading, then it makes no sense to slice the list
into separate sentences. Rather, the list becomes a “statement” in the
statutory sense, and a basis of liability, as a unit. It must therefore be
either forward-looking or not forward-looking in its entirety.167
The Ivax court’s ultimate basis for protecting the laundry list as forward looking
emphasizes the peril of reading this somewhat blanket statement out of context. In
fact, the Eleventh Circuit went on to characterize the entire laundry list as
“assumptions underlying a forward-looking statement,” which themselves qualify
under the express terms of the statute as forward-looking statements.168 The Ivax
ruling on this point was clearly limited to mixed lists of assumptions underlying
predictions—and then only when the plaintiff alleges that the list as a whole is
misleading by omission, not that an existing fact is there misstated.169 But this
express limitation has not stopped the messy process of ad hoc judicial
determination from improperly applying it beyond its explicit boundaries. Indeed, a

164. Id. at 937; cf. Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 805 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that
“a statement about the state of a company whose truth or falsity is discernible only after it is
made necessarily refers only to future performance” regardless of the present or future
tense—or, indeed, sense—of the language used).
165. 182 F.3d at 799.
166. Id. at 802–03.
167. Id. at 806 (emphasis in original).
168. Id. at 807.
169. Id. (“[A] list or explanation will only qualify for this treatment if it contains
assumptions underlying a forward-looking statement. . . . For these reasons, we hold that
when the factors underlying a projection or economic forecast include both assumptions and
statements of known fact, and a plaintiff alleges that a material factor is missing, the entire
list of factors is treated as a forward-looking statement.” (emphasis added)).
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number of cases have used the quoted language to support their finding that mixed
statements generally can be afforded forward-looking statement status and
protected by the safe harbor.170 This approach may indeed grant a license to lie and
therefore must be avoided.
***
The opinions discussed here illustrate the difficult but achievable task courts
face in ensuring that the safe harbor does not improperly protect misstatements of
historical fact. But to further ensure respect for both the text and the legislative
purpose of the safe harbor, courts must be wary of extending this type of parsing
into the arena of risk factors, which is the essence of the flaw in the SeeBeyond and
Asher cases.
B. Steering Clear of the Defect in SeeBeyond and Asher
Using different analytical processes, the SeeBeyond and Asher courts interject
on the one hand a good faith requirement and on the other a factual basis
requirement into Prong One. Thus, while perhaps more sophisticated than
Schaffer’s error, these opinions similarly represent an inappropriate use of the
bespeaks caution doctrine. Viewed collectively, their specific analytical and
jurisprudential defect is to assess the issuer’s projections and attendant risk factors
from the standpoint of the issuer rather than from the standpoint of the recipient of
the statement. The cure for this flaw is to refocus the inquiry on the reasonable
investor, as discussed below.
1. Focus on the Investor Rather than the Issuer
To properly apply Prong One at the dismissal stage, a court must sidestep the
good-faith-belief-and-factual-basis quagmire invited by inquiry into what the issuer
knew or what it actually faced when it made the projections at issue. Instead, the
statute itself along with its legislative history and policy rationales dictate that the
meaningfulness of cautionary language be assessed from the perspective of its
effect on the investor and the market to which it was communicated. The required
analysis is rooted in, but not coincident with, the traditional conception of
materiality.171

170. E.g., In re Compuware Sec. Litig., 301 F. Supp. 2d 672, 684–85 (E.D. Mich. 2004)
(entire 10-K); In re Smith Gardner Sec. Litig., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1306 (S.D. Fla. 2002)
(entire press release); In re Unicapital Corp. Sec. Litig., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1374 (S.D.
Fla. 2001) (entire press release).
171. The now-familiar test for materiality in federal securities fraud cases comes from
the definition of materiality the Supreme Court adopted in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), which is whether the plaintiff has made
a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the
omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the
reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood
that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
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As the Ninth Circuit has explained in another context, when the question is
whether a disclosure is adequate, “the application of the reasonable investor test is
appropriate because adequacy of disclosure, like materiality, only can be judged
against an objective standard of investor behavior.”172 In other words: would an
investor have been misled by this forward-looking statement and its attendant risk
factors?173 Or: would an investor have relied on such a projection, accompanied as
it is by admonitions of risk? Or: would the forward-looking statement have
changed the reasonable investor’s investment decision despite the stated risks of the
projection not materializing?
The first of these questions obviously speaks to the misleading nature of the
statement made. The second uses the vernacular of reliance. And the third
formulation may be categorized most accurately as the traditional inquiry into
materiality. But at the heart of each of these questions, in the present context, is an
attempt to define the effect of the statement on the reader or listener. Where the
answer is unquestionably no—to any or all of these questions—the risk information
has effectively neutralized the projection’s optimistic message and rendered the
projection in its context inactionable.
The word “inactionable” is intentionally used here rather than the word
immaterial, which was employed by the Third Circuit in its opinion in Prong One’s
progenitor, In re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation.174 This is because
to focus here on (the element of) materiality without regard to the propensity of a
projection to mislead is misguided. While the view of materiality as residing in a
silo may be appropriate in some 10(b) claims of verifiably false statements, it is
inappropriate in cases involving projections, which by definition are not verifiable
facts, at least not without hindsight. In a case involving allegedly fraudulent
projections, the plaintiffs are not alleging that the projection was false per se, but
instead that the projection was misleading, due to an omission either of salient risk
factors or of existing facts that, if known, would have debunked the projection, or
at a minimum more appropriately deflated the projection’s optimistic tone. To
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total mix” of
information made available.
Id. at 449; see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 (1988).
172. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1268 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis
added).
173. Beck, supra note 7, advances this hypothesis as well. Unfortunately, despite his
having accurately pinpointed the critical need to assess the misleading quality of a projection
when evaluating a Prong One defense, Mr. Beck’s prescription fails to correct the district
courts’ misinterpretation of Prong One:
Besides maintaining a logical relationship between policy objectives and
statutory means, any set of interpretations of the three safe harbor provisions
ought to also satisfy at least the following three criteria: (1) each provision
should protect some set of forward-looking statements that the other two
provisions do not (in other words, none of the three provisions should be
rendered superfluous by the other two); (2) the provisions should provide
acceptable guidance to managers; and (3) the interpretations ought to be
reasonable constructions of the statutory language.
Id. at 199 (footnotes omitted); see Freeland v. Iridium World Commc’ns, Ltd., 545 F. Supp.
2d 59, 72 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Beck’s language).
174. 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993).
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consider the materiality element in a vacuum, or even to overuse the word
materiality as a matter of diction, is to lose sight of the element’s nuance, especially
in this setting.175
Professor Brudney has called materiality an “open-ended concept.”176 Indeed,
the label “material” or “immaterial” in a securities fraud opinion can and does
encompass a diversity of similar conclusions about the facts disclosed or allegedly
omitted. In various contexts, an immaterial statement may be an inconsequential
one177 or one that is statistically insignificant.178 Alternatively, an immaterial matter
may be one that fails to “alter[] the ‘total mix’ of information,”179 or one that in
hindsight failed to move the market.180 Or, an immaterial statement may be deemed
so because it is too vague to be relied upon.181 Similarly, it may be held to be

175. Mr. Beck argues that since the Third Circuit’s Trump opinion was published,
bespeaks caution rhetoric has inappropriately focused on materiality, and thus to the extent
the statutory safe harbor is interpreted to codify this version of the bespeaks caution doctrine,
it will not encourage issuers to disclose material information. Beck, supra note 7, at 198.
This is precisely the semantic problem identified here. An optimistic projection that has been
effectively neutralized by meaningful cautionary statements, which is no longer legally too
optimistic or couched in the form of a guarantee, may be called immaterial as a matter of
law. But these inactionable (legally “immaterial” per Trump) projections may still be
valuable to those professional investors that read and understand them in their dynamic,
multifaceted milieu.
176. Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Information Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REV. 723, 725 (1989) (defining materiality as a balance between
relevance and reliability, and discussing the various normative considerations associated
with assessing materiality of forward-looking statements made in a variety of contexts); see
also Michael J. Kaufman, Living in a Material World: Strict Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 19
CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (1990) (arguing that materiality subsumes all other elements of a 10(b)
action); Kripke, supra note 98, at 1067 (offering that “[w]e know very little about
materiality,” and ruminating on various formulations of the concept).
177. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 2006)
(“The crux of materiality is whether, in context, an investor would reasonably rely on the
defendant’s statement as one reflecting a consequential fact about the company.”), rev’d on
other grounds, 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
178. E.g., In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Sec. Litig., 150 F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1998).
179. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see also Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (stating that determination of materiality requires
delicate assessment of significance of inferences drawn by the reasonable shareholder); U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, Staff Accounting Bulletin: No. 99—Materiality, 17
C.F.R. § 211 (1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab
99.htm#body3.
A “truth on the market” argument is functionally similar. See, e.g., Longman v.
Food Lion, Inc., 197 F.3d 675, 687 (4th Cir. 1999) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (“The
majority incorrectly suggests that any public information contradicting [the issuer’s]
misleading statements forecloses the possibility of finding that those statements were
material.”).
180. E.g., No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W.
Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 928–30 (9th Cir. 2003); Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 284
(3d Cir. 2000).
181. See, e.g., Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 547 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[S]ome
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immaterial because it was not phrased in the form of a guarantee or simply because
it discouraged optimism.182
Regardless of the precise version of materiality to which a court refers, the
relationship between materiality and the misleading nature of a statement is
unmistakable. Courts have often logically melded the two.183 This has also been
true in cases alleging deceitful forward-looking statements, for example:
statements are so vague and such obvious hyperbole that no reasonable investor would rely
upon them. ‘The role of the materiality requirement is not to attribute to investors a childlike
simplicity but rather to determine whether a reasonable investor would have considered the
omitted information significant at the time.’” (quoting Hillson Partners Ltd. P’ship v. Adage,
Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 213 (4th Cir. 1994))).
182. E.g., ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Grp. v. Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336, 359 (5th Cir. 2002)
(noting in discussion of materiality that “‘projections of future performance not worded as
guarantees are generally not actionable under the federal securities laws’ as a matter of law”
(quoting Krim v. BancTexas Grp., Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1446 (5th Cir. 1993))).
183. See, e.g., Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 172 n.7 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The test for
whether a statement is materially misleading under Section 10(b) and Section 11 is ‘whether
the defendants’ representations, taken together and in context, would have misled a
reasonable investor.’” (quoting I. Meyer Pincus & Assocs. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936 F.2d
759, 761 (2d Cir. 1991))); Brody v. Transitional Hosps. Corp., 280 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir.
2002) (noting that a statement is misleading if it would give a reasonable investor the
“impression of a state of affairs that differs in a material way from the one that actually
exists”).
Indeed the thrust of the Trump holding was to disagree with “plaintiffs’ primary
argument—that the statement relating the Partnership’s belief in the Taj Mahal’s capacity to
generate ample income for the Partnership to make full payment on the bonds was materially
misleading.” In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 367 (3d Cir. 1993)
(emphasis added). This is so despite the Trump court’s focus on the term “materiality.” See
id. at 369 (“[T]he complaint cannot survive a motion to dismiss because ultimately it does
not sufficiently allege that the defendants made a material misrepresentation.” (emphasis in
original)). While the court’s holding is indeed expressly couched in terms of materiality, id.
at 368 n.10 (“[O]ur analysis here is predicated on the materiality requirement . . . .”), its
reasoning is inevitably more mixed:
We believe that given this extensive yet specific cautionary language, a
reasonable factfinder could not conclude that the inclusion of [the challenged
statement] would influence a reasonable investor’s investment decision. More
specifically, we believe that due to the disclaimers and warnings the prospectus
contains, no reasonable investor could believe anything but that the Taj Mahal
bonds represented a rather risky, speculative investment . . . . We hold that
under this set of facts, the bondholders cannot prove that the alleged
misrepresentation was material.
Id. at 369 (emphasis added). Later in the opinion, in discussing the consistency of
its own decision with Supreme Court dicta on cautionary statements, the Trump
court notes:
We understand Virginia Bankshares to indicate that if the nature of the subject
matter or the manner of presentation of an alleged misrepresentation or
omission or its accompanying statements is such that for a reasonable investor
the accompanying statements do not offset the misleading effect of the
misrepresentation or omission, then bespeaks caution is unavailable as a
defense.
Id. at 373 (emphasis added).
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When there is cautionary language in the disclosure, the Court analyzes
“the allegedly fraudulent materials in their entirety to determine
whether a reasonable investor would have been misled. The touchstone
of the inquiry is not whether isolated statements within a document
were true, but whether defendants’ representations or omissions,
considered together and in context, would affect the total mix of
information and thereby mislead a reasonable investor regarding the
nature of the securities offered.”184
Whether intentionally or by happenstance,185 this statement recognizes all of the
subtleties of Prong One. It does not contemplate the issuer’s state of mind. It
assesses, though not exclusively, the propensity of the statement to mislead. It also
considers, but does not limit itself to, the recipient’s resultant conduct. And finally,
with its reference to the reasonable investor, it accomplishes the objectivity of
standard that the statutory safe harbor requires.
2. Defining Meaningful, and the Reasonable Investor Standard
Unquestionably, meaningful cautionary statements in this context should be
defined—as the legislative history suggests—as “substantive information about
factors that realistically could cause results to differ materially from those
projected.”186 Congress intentionally supplied this definition as a contrast to
Further, in discussing the bespeaks caution doctrine at length, the Trump panel
referred to such bespeaks caution precedents as I. Meyer Pincus, 936 F.2d 759 (2d Cir.
1991), and Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1991), as having
been materiality-based, 7 F.3d at 371, when those opinions might be more aptly described as
focusing on the misleading nature of the statements the plaintiffs there challenged. See Beck,
supra note 7, at 179–82. And, the Trump court’s explicit holding based on the bespeaks
caution doctrine reflects the unavoidably intertwined nature of the materiality and
misleading elements:
[W]e think it clear that the accompanying warnings and cautionary language
served to negate any potentially misleading effect that the prospectus’
[challenged statement] would have on a reasonable investor. The prospectus
clearly and precisely cautioned [the reader about the riskiness of the
investment]. Given this context, we believe that no reasonable jury could
conclude that the subject projection materially influenced a reasonable investor.
7 F.3d at 373.
184. Rombach, 355 F.3d at 173 (emphasis added) (quoting Halperin v. eBanker
USA.com, Inc., 295 F.3d 352, 357 (2d Cir. 2002)).
185. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The
Same Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud
Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83 (2002) (noting biases and bounded rationality of judges, in
particular given scarce judicial resources); see also Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 71, at
650–66 (discussing Congress’s contentment with ambiguity in the PSLRA).
186. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 43 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 742; see supra note 73 and text accompanying notes 72−73; cf. Rubinstein v. Collins,
20 F.3d 160, 167–68 (5th Cir. 1994); Trump, 7 F.3d at 371–72 (giving the definition
provided in leading pre-PSLRA authorities as “substantive and tailored to the specific future
projections, estimates or opinions in the [disclosure document] which the plaintiffs
challenge”); 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1997).
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boilerplate,187 which courts have repeatedly pointed out is insufficient to diffuse the
optimistic quality of a projection.188 More to the point, SeeBeyond and Asher’s
unique focus on and interpretation of the word “meaningful” should be rejected in
favor of the entire statutory term’s “normal” meaning.189
“Meaningful cautionary statements” accompanying predictions and projections
are those that temper the forward-looking statement with vigilance or otherwise
ground its buoyant character. In light of the thrust of the PSLRA, and the position
and purpose the safe harbor holds in contradistinction to its jurisprudential history,
the word meaningful in isolation should be read to denote the subject cautionary
statements’ ability to neutralize any overly optimistic or misleading quality of the
challenged projections.190
So what effectively neutralizes a forward-looking statement? What the PSLRA’s
drafters contemplated was the judiciary’s educated, neutral assessment of the effect
of the forward-looking statements and cautionary language on the reasonable
investor. When read in context, were the projections too prominent, too confidently
stated, or did they otherwise convey too much optimism, implying some sort of
guarantee? Or on the other hand, have plaintiffs ex post—as they did in Trump—
uncovered a buried projection that failed to materialize,191 one that from a fair and
neutral (albeit theoretical) ex ante reading of the annual report or press release at
issue appeared uncertain?
As it turns out, the safe harbor and the reasonable investor standard advocated
for use in this context192 is nothing more than a practical, imperfect heuristic that

187. Notably, the original House bill required only a recitation that “actual results could
differ” from those predicted or projected. Rosen, supra note 9, at 653.
188. E.g., Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 604 F.3d 758, 772 (2d Cir. 2010); Institutional
Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 256 (3d Cir. 2009); Southland Sec. Corp. v.
INSpire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 371−72 (5th Cir. 2004).
189. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 330 (2007) (noting it is
the courts’ job to give statutory language “its normal meaning”).
190. Cf. Coffee, supra note 1, at 990 (“The ‘bespeaks caution’ prong provides protection
when the cautionary statement renders the false statement (whether made knowingly or
recklessly) either objectively immaterial or incapable of being reasonably relied upon, but
not otherwise.”).
191. 7. F.3d at 371 (“In this case the Partnership did not bury the warnings about risks
amidst the bulk of the prospectus. Indeed, it was the allegedly misleading statement which
was buried amidst the cautionary language.”).
192. How the reasonable investor is defined is irrelevant in this setting. Indeed, the
reasonable investor standard advocated here, requiring assessment of the cautionary
statements’ ability to neutralize forward-looking statements, is not at odds with literature
eschewing the reasonable man standard as a measure of what is materially misleading in
other contexts. See, e.g., John M. Newman, Mark Herrmann & Geoffrey J. Ritts, Basic
Truths: The Implications of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory for Evaluating the
“Misleading” and “Materiality” Elements of Securities Fraud Claims, 20 J. CORP. L. 571
(1995). Mr. Newman and his coauthors argue that the perceptions of and effect on the
“prototypical” investor—the sophisticated professional investor whose conduct affects the
price of a security—and not the “reasonable investor” ought to be the yardstick by which
materiality and the propensity to mislead are measured in “fraud-on-the-market cases.” Id. at
586. A major premise of their argument is that the burden is on plaintiffs to plead and prove
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enables courts to do justice on an ad hoc basis by dismissing those allegations of
deceptive projections that are most likely the product of hindsight.193 Professor
Langevoort well describes the “artificial nature of the inquiry in which courts must
engage when deciding whether to dismiss” such a claim:
[I]n a class action based on securities fraud, preliminary motions
usually must be decided without reference to realistic stories about the
investment decision. The question of reliance—the role of the
disclosure in class members’ decisions to invest . . . [i]n cases under
rule 10b-5 . . . is either presumed away or deferred until much later.
Thus, the judge faced with a motion to dismiss in a bespeaks caution
setting must assume . . . that individual investors read and were affected
by the disclosures in question. Further, the judge must ignore any
factors that might have influenced the investors’ individual decisions.
The action can be dismissed only upon a finding that a reasonable
investor who read the document would not have been misled by the
disclosure or considered it important in making his or her decision. The
Trump case illustrates the feeling of artificiality. The court’s task was to
concentrate on a single sentence buried in the midst of highly technical
disclosure on the twenty-eighth page of a prospectus . . . . The
likelihood that one sentence by itself influenced many decisions at all
strains credulity . . . .194
While Professor Langevoort there spoke of the bespeaks caution doctrine before
the enactment of the PSLRA, his observation is probably even more apt as applied
to the judicial task required by Prong One.195 In private securities litigation, the
a material misrepresentation or omission, and proof of materiality is analytically and
practically indistinguishable from proof of loss causation (which in practice involves
assessment of what market professionals actually did in response to an issuer’s disclosures);
therefore efficiency would be better achieved by utilizing a “professional investor” standard.
See id. at 586–90. On the other end of the spectrum, Professor Margaret Sachs has advocated
for the use of a “least sophisticated investor” standard in the context of inefficient markets.
Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The Case for Replacing “the Reasonable
Investor” with “the Least Sophisticated Investor” in Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. REV.
473, 474–81 (2006). Neither Professor Sachs nor the Newman group addresses (nor do they
purport to address) disclosure of forward-looking statements or the somewhat unique
procedural and analytical setting of motions to dismiss based on the statutory safe harbor.
193. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998) (arguing that the legal system incorporates an
understanding of the profound implications of the hindsight bias).
194. Langevoort, supra note 1, at 492–93. Ultimately, though Professor Langevoort
observes that the bespeaks caution doctrine disregards behavioral research proving that
“optimism sells” and that “caution-laden estimates [might mislead] even . . . the more
sophisticated and rational segment of the investor population,” he does express some
confidence in its utility. Id. at 493–94.
195. Congress undoubtedly had the benefit of Professor Langevoort’s views, as well as
the Supreme Court’s remarks in Virginia Bankshares, when it drafted the statutory safe
harbor using the specific language it chose. Congress acknowledged Professor Langevoort’s
expertise in securities fraud litigation by requesting his testimony on another aspect of the
PSLRA. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 2 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 681
(acknowledging May 12, 1994 testimony of Donald C. Langevoort at hearing on the
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determination of a projection’s propensity to materially mislead is a hypothetical
evaluation not grounded in the reality of the issuer’s subjective environment nor in
its scienter or lack thereof. Instead, given the fact that few, if any, investors are
likely to have personally relied on or even to have read (and a priori not have been
misled by) the projection at issue, the “meaningful cautionary language”
requirement of Prong One is simply a judge’s considered determination, as a matter
of law, that too much hindsight is being offered as evidence of deception.196 This is
what Congress intended by permitting evidence of “meaningful cautionary
statements” to be proffered and considered at the motion to dismiss stage, and it is
a fine example of the legal system acknowledging and incorporating hindsight in a
beneficial way.197
CONCLUSION
Issuers’ voluntary disclosure of forward-looking statements accompanied by
risk factors and other cautionary language is now standard. Similarly, allegations
that the issuers’ projections and predictions are false are now the norm in class
action securities fraud suits. The statutory text and legislative history are clear that
the intent of the issuer in making such forward-looking statements, as long as
meaningful cautionary statements attend them, is irrelevant. Even so, a minority of
courts have expressed a repugnance to faithful application of the PSLRA’s safe
harbor in this context, accepting a variety of illogical and unsound arguments that
not only hinder the safe harbor’s intended effect but which contribute to a
patchwork of irrational jurisprudence.
While perhaps understandable, this circumvention of the safe harbor is
nonetheless misguided. The safe harbor’s arena is outside the comfort of the
bespeaks caution doctrine and Rule 3(b)(6), where an issuer’s good faith and a
reasonable factual basis are required when making forward-looking statements. Use
of these standards for assessment of claims of false projections and predictions,
while more familiar and seemingly just, is prohibited by the PSLRA.
To give full effect to the statutory safe harbor, courts faced with allegations of
fraudulent forward-looking statements must carefully parse mixed statements so as
to avoid protecting false statements of existing fact. On a more holistic level, they
must also consider the overall effect of the disclosed risk factors together with the
forward-looking statements to ascertain whether a reasonable investor would have
been materially deceived, or whether the complaint is at bottom what Congress
sought to eliminate with the PSLRA—baseless suits that allege fraud by hindsight.
In this manner, any predisposition of the statutory safe harbor to create a license to
lie can be minimized and its salutary effects on corporate disclosure maximized.
Supreme Court’s Central Bank decision).
196. A number of courts have met this standard without classifying it as such. E.g., GSC
Partners CDO Fund v. Washington, 368 F.3d 228, 242 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Any reasonable
reading of this statement, would make one skeptical about the recovery of the full $235
million.”); Asher v. Baxter Int’l Inc., No. 02 C 5608, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12905, at *43
(N.D. Ill. July 24, 2003) (holding that Baxter’s cautionary language was sufficient “to give a
reasonable investor notice of the risks of investing in Baxter and to undertake further
investigation into Baxter before investing in its stock” (emphasis added)).
197. See generally Rachlinski, supra note 193.

